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Abstract
This paper analyzes the influence that juvenile offenders serving time in the same correctional facility have on
each other’s subsequent criminal behavior.  The analysis is based on data on over 8,000 individuals serving
time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities during a two-year period in Florida.  These data provide a complete
record of past crimes, facility assignments, and arrests and adjudications in the year following release for each
individual.  To control for the non-random assignment of juveniles to facilities, we include facility fixed effects
in the analysis.  This ensures that the impact of peers on recidivism is identified using only the variation in the
length of time that any two individuals serving a sentence in the same facility happen to overlap.  We find strong
evidence of peer effects for various categories of theft, burglary, and felony drug and weapon crimes; the
influence of peers primarily affects individuals who already have some experience in a particular crime
category.  
JEL Classification:  H0, J0, J2, K1
Keywords:  social learning, peer effects, social interactions, recidivism, juvenile crime, human capital
accumulation“Danbury wasn’t a prison.  It was a crime school.  I went in with a bachelor of 
marijuana and came out with a doctorate of cocaine.” 
George Jung (Johnny Depp) describing his introduction  
to the cocaine industry in the motion picture Blow. 
 
I. Introduction 
Juvenile crime is a serious problem in modern American society.  In 2000, law 
enforcement agencies throughout the United States made approximately 2.4 million arrests of 
juveniles under the age of eighteen, or approximately one arrest for every 10 individuals between 
the ages of thirteen and eighteen  (FBI, 2001; Puzzanchera et al., 2002).  More than 500,000 of 
these arrests were for property crimes; more than 200,000 were for drug-related violations; and 
almost 100,000 were for violent crimes (FBI, 2001).  On any given day in 1999, over 100,000 
juvenile offenders were being held in residential placement (Sickmund, 2002).  Concerned with 
the magnitude of these statistics, a number of researchers have attempted to identify the factors 
that influence juvenile crime.  In particular, studies have often focused on factors illuminated in 
Becker’s economic model of crime (1968), such as the deterrent effect of sanctions, the 
probability of getting caught, and legitimate sources of income.
1  Few papers, however, have 
considered how the characteristics and behavior of an individual’s peers affect his or her 
propensity to engage in criminal activity.  The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical 
evidence on such peer effects in juvenile crime.  We do so by examining them in a setting where 
interactions among individuals with criminal experience are likely to be particularly intense: 
juvenile correctional facilities.  
 Criminal behavior may be affected by peer effects that occur in the family, in school, on 
the street corner, in a gang, in the neighborhood, or in prison.  Such peer effects may arise from 
any number of underlying mechanisms related to the social interactions between two individuals 
or a group of individuals; it is helpful for interpreting the results of our analysis to enumerate 
some of these mechanisms here.
2  We focus on potential mechanisms related to the criminal 
                                                 
1 For example, Levitt (1998) shows that harsher punishments for juveniles are strongly associated with 
lower rates of juvenile offending for both violent crimes and property crimes.  Grogger (1998) finds a 
negative relationship between market wages and youth crime.  Mocan and Rees (1999) study the impact of 
juvenile arrest rates, unemployment, and family structure on the propensity of juveniles to commit both 
violent crimes and property crimes. 
2 The theoretical literature in sociology and, more recently, in economics describes many of the potential 
channels through which social interactions may work.  Sutherland (1939) highlights learning from peers, in 
the form of information, skill acquisition, and behavioral norms; this mechanism is also incorporated into 
the models of Sah (1991) and Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2003).  Ethnographic studies by Anderson 
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  experience of an individual’s peers, grouping these mechanisms into three broad categories: (i) 
those related to a social stigma, (ii) those related to the reinforcement of addictive behavior, and 
(iii) those related to information dispersion and network formation.  Social stigma refers to the 
impact that an individual’s peers have on behavior related to perceived pressures, social norms, 
and other similar social influences.  The standard hypothesis in this case is that when an 
individual is exposed to peers who regard criminal activity in a negative way, the individual is 
less likely to participate in such behavior.  Similarly, exposure to peers with a greater intensity of 
criminal experience can reduce or reverse this stigma, thereby increasing the propensity of the 
individual to participate in criminal activity.  Second, especially in the case of drug crimes, 
addiction or habit-formation may play a significant role in an individual’s propensity to recidivate 
with such a crime.  Peer interactions would be important in this case if exposure to peers with 
similar habits or addictions reinforces an individual’s own addiction.     
The third mechanism listed above relates to the dissemination of crime-related 
information through peer interactions, which we label social learning, and the development of 
criminal networks.
3  Social learning may occur because individuals use the experiences of their 
peers to update their beliefs concerning the expected benefits or punishments of committing 
particular crimes, making individuals more or less likely to commit these crimes.  Alternatively, 
social learning may take the form of the acquisition of crime-specific skills and knowledge, such 
as how to steal a car, how to disconnect a burglary alarm, or how to avoid being caught by the 
police.  In this case, interactions with individuals who have experience committing a particular 
type of crime may allow an individual to acquire this knowledge more easily, thereby leading to 
increased activity in the corresponding crime category. Finally, access to individuals with 
experience in a given criminal activity might assist in the formation or expansion of an 
individual’s criminal network.  Networking of this sort is especially important in more 
complicated criminal activities such as those related to illegal drugs, which require a great deal of 
coordination among manufacturers, distributors, sellers, and users. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1990, 1999) and the theoretical model of Silverman (2002) describe social interactions that arise through 
reputational effects.  Criminal gangs and other crime networks may also have productive in addition to 
learning effects (Sarnecki, 2001; Warr, 2002). 
3 There is a small but growing body of research in economics on social learning and network formation, 
including Besley and Case (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (1999), and Conley and Udry 
(2002).   
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  While distinguishing the existence and magnitude of peer effects or social interactions 
has been the focus of a large body of recent empirical research in economics,
4,5 empirical work 
exploring the importance of social interactions in criminal behavior has been relatively limited.  
The few papers that attempt to provide direct evidence of social interactions are generally subject 
to serious concerns regarding the non-random selection or assignment of an individual’s peers.
6  
Indirect evidence of social interactions is provided by Sah (1991) and Glaeser, Sacerdote, and 
Scheinkman (1996); these authors conclude that social interactions must play an important role in 
criminal behavior as crime exhibits variation across time and space that is difficult to explain with 
observable differences in the economic and social environment.
7  Additionally, Jacob and 
Lefgren’s (2003) finding, that school attendance increases the amount of violent crimes but 
decreases the amount of property crimes, underscores the role played by social interactions in 
explaining violent crimes.  
In light of the paucity of credible direct evidence to date, the central goal of this paper is 
to estimate the effects of peer characteristics on criminal behavior in a manner that deals directly 
with the non-random assignment of individuals to correctional facilities and, consequently, to 
their peers.  Specifically, we examine whether the behavior of a juvenile offender after being 
                                                 
4 The goal of much of the recent literature in economics has been to deal explicitly with the three traditional 
difficulties involved in the estimation of social interactions in linear models: the simultaneity (reflection) 
problem, the non-random selection of individuals into peer groups, and the presence of correlated 
unobservable factors that affect the behavior or outcomes of everyone in a peer group.  Moffitt (2001) 
provides an excellent overview of these difficulties.  See Brock and Durlauf (2001) for a discussion of 
these issues in a nonlinear context.  
5 A great deal of recent work in the economics of education literature, in particular, has explicitly attempted 
to deal with the non-random selection of individuals into schools and classrooms.  See, for example, Evans, 
Oates, and Schwab (1992); Hanushek et al. (2000); Hoxby (2000); Sacerdote (2000); Boozer and Cacciola 
(2001); and Angrist and Lang (2002). 
6 Reiss (1988) and Warr (1996) provide a summary of sociological research based on co-offender surveys, 
which universally do not control for the non-random selection of peers as well as other endogeneity issues.  
Thornberry et al. (1993, 2003) provide evidence that criminal behavior increases once individuals become 
members of gangs, but no attempt is made to control for the non-random timing of the decision to join a 
gang.  More recently, Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield (2001) use the Moving to Opportunity experiment 
to study the effects of neighborhoods on criminal behavior.  They find that a shift to a wealthier 
neighborhood decreases violent while increasing property crimes, but it remains unclear whether their 
results are driven by changes in private incentives or social interactions.  Gaviria and Raphael (2001) find 
strong evidence of peer-group effects in the crime-related behaviors of drug use, alcohol drinking, and 
cigarette smoking for a sample of high school students.  But there is mixed evidence on the extent to which 
endogenous sorting across schools inflates their peer effects measures.  
7 Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2001) are able to explain much of the aggregate dynamic variation in 
crime over the past quarter-century without relying explicitly on social interactions. 
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  released from a correctional facility is influenced by the characteristics of individuals with whom 
he concurrently served time in that facility.  The analysis is based on data on over 8,000 
individuals serving time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities during a two-year period in Florida.  
These data provide a complete record of past crimes, facility assignments, and arrests and 
adjudications in the year following release for each individual.   
Our empirical analysis consists of a series of regressions that relate recidivism in each of 
a number of crime categories to individual demographic and criminal history characteristics, peer 
demographic and criminal history characteristics, and interactions between these individual and 
peer characteristics.  To control for the non-random assignment of juveniles to facilities, we 
include facility fixed effects in these regressions.  This ensures that the impact of peers on 
recidivism is identified using only the variation in the length of time that any two individuals 
serving a sentence in the same facility happen to overlap.   
Relative to other settings where the estimation of social interactions has proven more 
difficult, this empirical strategy exploits a unique feature of correctional facilities—namely, that 
the peer group is constantly evolving over time with the admittance and release of individuals as 
their sentences begin and expire.
8  As long as the date at which a given individual is assigned to a 
facility within the two-year sample period is random with respect to the peers in the facility at 
that time, this empirical strategy properly controls for the non-random assignment of individuals 
to facilities.  In our analysis, we provide evidence that this is indeed the case by demonstrating 
that the within-facility variation in peer characteristics is orthogonal to individual characteristics.
9 
    We find strong evidence of the existence of peer effects in juvenile correctional facilities.  
In many instances, these peer effects have a reinforcing nature, whereby exposure to peers with a 
history of committing a particular crime increases the probability that an individual who has 
                                                 
8 Recent research in other settings has generally relied on particular randomizing events, such as the 
random assignment of roommates (Sacerdote, 2000) or randomization derived from social experiments 
such as the Moving to Opportunity experiment in Boston (Katz, Kling, and Leibman, 2001) or the STAR 
experiment in Tennessee schools (Boozer and Cacciola, 2001).  Relying on such events or experiments, 
however, can severely limit the settings where peer effects can be studied and the generalizability of the 
findings.  
9 In the context of juvenile correctional facilities, the simultaneity problem (first described by Manski 
(1993)) is that the influence of peer characteristics, such as the intensity of peer criminal history, cannot be 
distinguished from the influence of future peer behavior.  While it is possible that spending time in the 
same correctional facility increases future interactions among individuals upon release, this is likely to 
explain a relatively small portion of the peer effects measured in this paper.  Thus, we simply assume that 
peer effects operate through the influence of peer characteristics rather than subsequent peer behavior.   
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  already committed the same type of crime recidivates with that crime.  This form of a reinforcing 
peer effect is positive and significant for the cases of burglary, felony drug offenses, felony 
weapon offenses, and felony sex offenses in our main specification, and it is positive and 
significant for auto theft, grand larceny, petty larceny, misdemeanor drug offenses, and robbery in 
alternative specifications that refine the peer measure in various ways.  There is much less 
evidence that exposure to peers with particular criminal histories increases an individual’s 
propensity to recidivate in a crime category in which the individual has no prior experience; in 
our main specification, the corresponding coefficient is positive and significant only for felony 
sex offenses and negative and significant only for robbery.  The latter result suggests that 
individuals may learn the returns to robbery are not sufficient, in the face of relatively severe 
punishment, to justify committing one.  Our results also provide strong evidence that older 
individuals exert stronger peer effects than younger individuals, in part because of their more 
extensive criminal experience, and they exert these peer effects more intensely on younger 
individuals. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data.   
Section III outlines our basic empirical methodology, identification strategy, and measurement 
issues.  Section IV presents the main results, and Section V examines a series of policy issues 
related to these results.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Data 
The primary data source for this study is the internal database that the Florida Department 
of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) maintains for juvenile offenders under its care.  We were granted access 
to the DJJ’s records on all youths released from a Florida-based juvenile correctional facility 
between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1999.  These data provide complete histories of the experience 
of each individual in the Florida juvenile justice system, including records of all past arrests, 
adjudications,
10 sentences, and facility assignments.  The data also provide some basic socio-
demographic information, such as date of birth, race, and zip code of residence at the time of the 
individual’s most recent assignment to a facility.  16,164 youths are included in the full sample.  
                                                 
10 An adjudication, in the vernacular of the juvenile justice system, is analogous to a conviction in the adult 
system.  
  6 
  For each individual in the initial sample, the data detail whether or not the individual 
recidivates within the first year following release.  The type of crime committed upon 
recidivating, however, is only available if the individual is younger than age eighteen at the date 
of re-arrest and, thus, still a juvenile in the Florida system.  In analyzing post-release criminal 
behavior, we therefore eliminate from the sample all individuals who are older than age seventeen 
when released; for all individuals remaining in the sample, we observe if the individual 
recidivates and (if so) the details of the recidivism offense.  While the initial sample contains 
records for 16,164 individuals, only 9,382 of these individuals remained juveniles for at least one 
year after release.  For an additional 1,166 of these individuals, the data are either missing facility 
assignment or admit/release date information.  Thus, the primary sample used in our analysis 
contains 8,216 juveniles.  However, data for the full set of individuals for whom facility 
assignment and admit/release date information is available are used in constructing the measures 
of peer characteristics used in the analysis.   
The sample includes not only detailed information on recidivism behavior, but also data 
on the youths’ correctional facility assignments, criminal histories, personal characteristics, and 
home neighborhoods.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  67 percent of the sample 
recidivated—meaning they had a subsequent juvenile adjudication within one year after being 
released from a correctional facility to the community or to a conditional release program.  Rather 
than focusing on whether or not an individual recidivates with any offense, we study the types of 
offenses with which an individual recidivates.  Table 1 shows that 14 percent of the sample 
recidivates with a burglary offense, 12 percent recidivates with a petty larceny offense, and 
approximately 9 percent recidivates with a felony drug offense, a misdemeanor drug offense, an 
auto theft, and a grand larceny offense.  Because individuals can be adjudicated for multiple 
offenses simultaneously, the sum of the recidivism rates in all possible crime categories is greater 
than the overall recidivism rate of 67 percent. 
Each individual was assigned to one of 169 correctional facilities in Florida.  These 
facilities vary greatly in type: there are halfway houses, group treatment homes, boot camps, 
contracted day treatment programs, intensive residential treatment programs, sex offender 
programs, work and wilderness programs, etc.  One of the primary distinguishing characteristics 
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  of a facility is whether it is residential or non-residential.
11  In addition, there is some variation in 
the size of these facilities.  The average number of individuals released from a facility is 197 
(averaged across the individuals in the sample), with a minimum of 13 and a maximum of 981.  
The average number of individuals in a facility on a given day is 48, with a large standard 
deviation of 74.
12 
The individual characteristics listed in Table 1 provide basic information on the youths’ 
age, gender, race, and sentence length.  The criminal history variables in Table 1 encompass all 
charges formally brought against the youth within the Florida system prior to placement in a 
correctional facility during the two-year evaluation period.  The individual criminal history 
variables are dummy variables that are equal to one if an individual has any history of committing 
a particular type of offense, regardless of the number of times the individual has committed the 
offense.  Thus, we see that 61 percent of the individuals in the sample have a history of petty 
larceny, 58 percent have a history of burglary, 37 percent have a history of a felony weapon 
offense, 13 percent have a history of a felony drug offense, and so on.  The neighborhood 
characteristics variables are constructed using each individual’s zip code of residence.  With the 
exception of Youth Crime Rate in Zip, which comes directly from DJJ records, these 
neighborhood measures are derived from the 1990 Census of Population of Housing.  
Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics for the measures of peer characteristics.  For 
the most part, the list of peer characteristics parallels the list of individual characteristics (the 
demographic, criminal history, and neighborhood characteristics).  The peer characteristics are 
calculated as weighted averages of the individual characteristics, where the weights are the 
number of days an individual is exposed to each peer.  Not surprisingly, the average peer group to 
which an individual is exposed generally reflects the distribution of crimes in the individual 
criminal histories.  Slight differences arise because the individual crime histories are averaged 
over individuals while the peer measures are averaged over days, thus weighting more heavily the 
crimes of individuals serving longer sentences. 
                                                 
11 In non-residential facilities, the committed juveniles are allowed to return home at night.  
12 The corresponding median facility size (across individuals), however, is only 20 individuals, as a couple 
of facilities are particularly large.  We examine specifications below that limit the sample to individuals in 
facilities with less than 20 peers.  
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III.  Empirical Methodology and Measurement Issues 
The primary analysis presented in this paper relates recidivism to vectors of individual 
characteristics, peer characteristics, and interactions between the two.  Recidivism is used as an 
imperfect proxy for criminal behavior throughout our analysis.  Clearly, recidivism is a function 
of both actual criminal activity and the probability of arrest and adjudication.  To the extent that 
some peer effects take the form of learning to avoid arrest and adjudication, we expect our 
analysis to understate the overall level of increased criminal activity that follows exposure to 
peers with a greater intensity of experience in a given crime category.  The general specification 
that we take to the data can be written as  
 
                                               ij j ij ij ij ij ij X P X P R ε λ γ β α + + + + =                                           (1) 
 
where Rij is a dummy variable that is equal to one if individual i, having served time in facility j, 
recidivates; Pij is a vector of peer characteristics; Xij is a vector of individual characteristics; and 
λj  is a facility fixed effect.  For each individual, the associated peer characteristics are a weighted 
average of the characteristics of an individual’s peers in a facility, where the weights are equal to 
the number of days an individual is exposed to each peer in the facility.  In this way, because 
individuals are admitted and released on a regular basis throughout our sample period, the 
characteristics of the peers to whom any particular individual is exposed vary depending on when 
exactly that individual enters and leaves a facility. 
The inclusion of facility fixed effects in equation (1) controls for the non-random 
assignment of individuals to facilities as well as any part of the error structure correlated across 
all of the individuals in a facility.  This ensures that the impact of peers on recidivism is identified 
using only the variation in the length of time that any two individuals serving a sentence in the 
same facility happen to overlap.
13  In order for this methodology to yield unbiased peer effects, 
                                                 
13 A natural concern that arises when including facility fixed effects is whether there is sufficient variation 
in the peer measures within facilities to identify peer effects precisely.  While the amount of variation in the 
peer measures does decrease with the inclusion of facility fixed effects, it is not eliminated.  This can be 
seen by comparing the overall standard deviation to the within standard deviation for each peer measure 
presented in Table 1.  The within standard deviation is the standard deviation of the residual peer measures 
that result from regressing the original peer measures on facility dummies. 
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  the timing of the assignment of individuals to facilities, with respect to the peers in the facility at 
that time, must be random within the two-year sample period.  To provide evidence concerning 
the validity of our identification strategy, Table 2 shows the correlations between the measures of 
peer characteristics used in the analysis and a wide range of individual demographic and criminal 
history variables.  The upper panel of Table 2 (labeled 2a) displays these correlations when the 
peer characteristics include variation both within and across facilities.  The lower panel of Table 2 
(labeled 2b), on the other hand, shows these correlations when the peer characteristics only 
include variation from within the facilities; in other words, the peer measures used in the lower 
panel are the residual peer measures that result from regressing the original peer measures on 
facility dummies.   
The correlation coefficients in the upper panel are in many instances quite large and 
typically much greater than the corresponding correlation coefficients in the lower panel. In fact, 
while the vast majority of the correlations between an individual’s own experience with particular 
crimes and that of his or her peers are positive and significant in the upper panel, these 
correlations are all negative in the lower panel.
14  Moreover, while the vast majority of the 
correlations between individual and peer criminal history in different crime categories is positive 
and significant in the upper panel, these correlations are almost never significant in the lower 
panel.  Accordingly, we conclude that the residual variation in the peer measures, having been 
projected onto the vector of facility dummy variables, is orthogonal to the included individual 
characteristics and, therefore, also almost certainly orthogonal to any unobserved individual 
characteristics related to recidivism.  Moreover, these correlations suggest that the timing of the 
assignment of individuals to facilities within this period is random.  That is, the slightly negative 
correlations between individual and peer criminal experience in a given crime category implies 
that, conditional on facility assignment, there is not any undo clustering in the timing of 
assignment to correctional facilities for individuals with particular criminal histories. 
                                                 
14 That these correlations are negative reflects the fact that we treat an individual as not being exposed to 
himself or herself as a peer.  The alternative assumption, treating an individual as his or her own peer, 
would lead to a correspondingly small positive correlation between individual and peer criminal 
experience.  Note also, that the raw correlations between own and peer criminal experience shown in the 
upper panel are positive despite the fact that we do not treat an individual as his or her own peer.  In the 
empirical specifications below, we always include a full set of variables describing both individual and peer 
criminal history.   
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  Another indication that the constructed peer measures are orthogonal to individual 
characteristics in a manner relevant for studying recidivism can be seen in Table 3.  This table 
shows the estimated coefficients from a regression of recidivism (with any crime) on individual 
characteristics when a vector of peer variables is included and excluded, respectively, in the 
estimation.  Inclusion of the vector of peer characteristics in the estimation has only a minimal 
effect on the magnitude and significance of the estimated individual characteristic coefficients.  
Hence, Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence that our strategy for identifying peer effects, in the 
presence of non-random assignment of individuals to facilities or correlation in the error term at 
the facility level, is well-grounded. 
 
Pre- and Post-Censoring 
  An important data-related issue in constructing the peer measures used in equation (1) 
arises because we only observe individuals who are released in the two-year period from July 1, 
1997 to June 30, 1999.  Thus, for individuals who are released towards the beginning of the 
sample period, any peers who are released before the sample period begins will not be observed 
in the data (pre-censoring case).  Likewise, for individuals who are released towards the end of 
the sample period, any peers who are released after the sample ends will be unobserved (post-
censoring case).   
Therefore, in order to provide an unbiased estimate of each individual’s peers, we 
estimate each individual’s exposure to peers who would have been released either before or after 
the sample period by using the characteristics of the individuals observed to be released from the 
facility during the full sample period.  In this way, we form the peer measure used in the analysis 
by averaging (i) the characteristics of those peers actually observed to overlap with the individual 
and (ii) a properly weighted measure of the estimated characteristics of the peers with whom this 
individual would have overlapped, but who were released outside of the sample period.
15  This 
ensures that the peer measure used in the analysis is an unbiased measure of the true peer measure 
for each individual.  Thus, while measurement error still exists in the peer characteristics, this 
error is uncorrelated with the individual characteristics included in the regression.  We describe 
                                                 
15 This procedure relies on the assumption that, conditional on facility assignment, the exact date at which a 
given individual is assigned to a facility is random with respect to the peers in the facility at that time—an 
assumption supported by the evidence described above.   
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  the exact procedure used to construct the peer measure, dealing with four separate cases of 
censoring, in the appendix.  We also provide evidence below that the remaining measurement 
error is likely to have only a negligible effect on the results. 
 
IV. Results 
The earlier discussion of the potential channels through which peers may influence an 
individual’s subsequent criminal behavior informs the empirical specifications we take to the 
data.  In particular, we consider the following primary specification 
 
     () 01 2 *_ _
hh h h h
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij j ij R Offense Peer offense Peer offense Offense P X β ββ α γ =+ + + λ ε + + +  (2) 
 
The dependent variable, R
h
ij, is a dummy variable for whether or not individual i in facility j 
recidivates with offense type h.  Peer_offense
h
ij represents an individual’s exposure to peers with 
a history of offense type h,  while  Offense
h
ij is a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
individual i has a history of offense type h himself.  Pij is a vector of additional peer demographic 
and criminal history characteristics, including all other crime categories.  Similarly, Xij represents 
a number of individual demographic and criminal history controls, including all other crime 
categories.  
While the specification described in equation (2) includes a complete set of controls for 
individual and peer criminal offenses, the central focus of the analysis below is on the question of 
whether exposure to peers with a history of committing a particular crime increases the likelihood 
that an individual recidivates with that same crime.  We also aim to distinguish whether or not 
this effect varies with an individual’s own characteristics, especially an individual’s own history 
of the offense in question.  This interaction would pick up the reinforcement of addictive behavior 
by others who may share a similar addiction.  Moreover, the peer effect mechanisms related to 
social learning and network formation developed in the introduction suggest that individuals with 
a prior history in a particular criminal activity may be especially receptive to additional training 
or to expanding network ties related to this activity.  Consider, for example, an individual who 
already has a high rate of return from stealing cars but has no experience in drug crimes.  For this 
individual, the drug-specific human capital gained from exposure to peers with a history of drug 
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  crimes may not provide sufficient incentive to switch from auto theft to drug crimes, as the gap 
between the rates of return for the two types of crimes may be too large.  On the other hand, 
additional exposure to peers with a history of auto theft may increase this gap in returns (as well 
as the gap between returns from auto theft and legitimate activity), thereby potentially increasing 
an individual’s propensity to commit auto theft upon release. 
Each column of Table 4 depicts the coefficients β0, β1, and β2 for a specification of the 
type shown in equation (2) for a particular offense type h.
16  The particular offenses shown here 
are chosen using three criterion: (i) the offense is serious enough to contribute to the FBI crime 
index; (ii) the crime is defined well enough to interpret the results; and (iii) enough individuals 
recidivate with the crime so that the estimation is reasonably precise.  Disorderly conduct is not 
included, for example, because the exact nature of the offense may vary greatly across crimes, 
and misdemeanor sex offense is not included because only 27 of the 8,216 individuals recidivate 
with this crime.  The full specification for each offense type h is shown in Appendix Table 1. 
 
Specialization 
The estimated coefficient on Offense
h
ij, an individual’s own history of the crime in 
question, describes the degree to which individuals specialize in crime category h—that is, the 
extent to which past activity predicts future activity.  The peer measures used in the analysis are 
constructed to have mean zero and, consequently, the test of specialization is simply a test of 
whether β2 > 0.  The estimates of β2 reported in Table 4 are positive and statistically significant in 
every instance.  The magnitudes of the effects are best understood in relation to the proportion of 
individuals who recidivate with each crime.  For example, having committed a felony drug crime 
in the past increases one’s likelihood of recidivating with a felony drug crime by approximately 
19 percentage points; this is relative to the baseline that 9.3 percent of the individuals released 
from a juvenile facility recidivate with a drug felony within a year.  Similarly, large effect sizes 
relative to the proportion of individuals who recidivate with a crime can be seen for felony sex 
crimes (5.2 percentage points versus 1.3 percent of individuals), misdemeanor drug crimes (11 
                                                 
16 While we look for evidence of peer effects in particular crime categories (such as grand larceny), it is 
certainly possible that individuals specialize in groups of particular crime categories (such as all thefts) 
rather than in just one particular crime category.  Appendix Table 1 reports the results of the full impact of 
an individual’s criminal history on the propensity to commit each crime, generally revealing broad 
specialization across drug crimes as well all forms of theft. 
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  percentage points versus 9 percent), robbery (4.2 percentage points versus 4.5 percent), auto theft 
(8 percentage points versus 9.3 percent), and felony weapon crimes (7.8 percentage points versus 
13.6 percent).  
There are a number of potential explanations for the relatively large degree of 
specialization in felony drug crimes, many of which relate back in some way to the various peer 
effects mechanisms described in the introduction.  Specialization in drug crimes, as opposed to 
other types of crimes, may be due to habit formation or addiction concerning personal drug usage.  
Moreover, crime-specific human capital and networks play an especially large role in felony drug 
crimes, which require a great deal of coordination in transferring the product from source to end 
user.  Thus, a potential explanation for the particularly strong specialization in felony drug crimes 
is that the human capital accumulation and network ties resulting from past activity in felony drug 
crimes are more important than those associated with past robbery activity, for example.  
In order to explore the role of specialization further, Table 5 reports the results for a 
series of specifications that add a vector of dummy variables, which characterize an individual’s 
most recent offense, to the specifications reported in Table 4.  This specification examines 
whether the timing of an individual’s past participation in a particular type of criminal activity is 
important in predicting recidivism with that crime.  The results indicate that having committed an 
offense recently has little to no additional effect on recidivism, over and above the effect of 
having any history of the offense.  In fact, the point estimates are more often negative than 
positive and only significant (in opposite directions) for misdemeanor drugs and robbery.  A 
possible explanation for this negative relationship is that an individual who has recently been 
caught and punished for a particular type of crime may have an especially strong aversion to 
repeating this offense.  This might indicate that youths have short-term memories—such that 
getting caught a few years ago does not have the same negative impact as getting caught 




                                                 
17 We also explored whether controlling for the total number of crimes committed to date affects these 
specialization results, finding almost no effect from including this additional control. 
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  Evidence of Peer Effects 
The first row of Table 4 reports β0,  the coefficient on the interaction between an 
individual’s history of having committed the relevant offense and the fraction of peers who have 
ever committed this offense.  The second row reports β1, the coefficient on the fraction of peers 
who have ever committed this offense.
18  These parameter estimates reveal little evidence that the 
intensity of exposure to peers with experience in a particular crime category affects the behavior 
of individuals who do not have any prior experience in that crime category.  β1 is negative as 
often as it is positive, with statistically significant evidence of increases in activity only for the 
case of sex crimes and of decreases in activity only for the case of robbery.  One possible 
explanation for the evidence of negative peer effects in this latter case is that individuals learn 
that the risk-return tradeoff for robbery is less favorable to the criminal than the tradeoff for other 
types of property crimes (auto theft, larceny, and burglary).  Levitt and Lochner (2001) estimate 
that the average return to both a property crime and a robbery is about $200, but because victims 
are more likely to report robberies to the police, they assert, there is a higher arrest rate for 
robbery and more severe punishments conditional on arrest.  They estimate that the average 
sentence length per crime committed served by juveniles for robbery is more than twenty times 
that served for other types of property crimes.  An analysis of our data yields similar statistics for 
sentence length (conditional on arrest and a punishment that involves assignment to a correctional 
facility);
19 for example, a first-time adjudication for robbery is associated with a sentence length 
almost sixty days longer on average than the sentence length for a first-time adjudication with 
another form of theft.
20  A regression of sentence length on recent and past criminal activity is 
reported in Appendix Table 2.   
                                                 
18 It is interesting to note that specifications run at an earlier stage of our analysis show that it is whether or 
not peers have a history of ever committing a particular offense, rather than the number of times they have 
committed the offense, that matters in the context of peer effects.  In other words, the peer effects 
associated with the peers’ first offense in a crime category appear to be much more important than the peer 
effects associated with the third or fourth offense in that category. 
19 Because our data consists of only those individuals released from facilities in a given period, we do not 
observe a representative sample of those arrested for a particular type of crime or even those adjudicated 
(convicted) for such crimes if some of these individuals are not assigned to a correctional facility. 
20 In a qualified attempt to examine whether individuals learn from their peers to avoid crimes with 
particularly long sentences, we examined specifications that included the weighted average sentence length 
of all of an individual’s peers and also specifications that included the crime-specific weighted average 
sentence length for peers.  Such peer sentence length measures do not significantly affect an individual’s 
propensity to recidivate with a particular crime category.  This non-result may arise, of course, because 
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  The parameter estimates for β0 reported in the first row of Table 4, however, are positive 
in every case and statistically significant for burglary, petty larceny, felony drug crimes, and 
felony weapon offenses.  In the case of burglary, felony drug crimes, and felony weapon offenses, 
the combination of β0  and β1  reveals a statistically significant, positive peer effect for 
individuals who have prior experience in a crime category.  Thus, exposure to a greater 
percentage of peers with a history of having committed burglary, for example, increases the 
likelihood that an individual with prior burglary experience commits burglary upon release.  As in 
the case of specialization, the strongest reinforcing peer effects occur for felony drug crimes.
21  
For an individual who has a felony drug offense history, exposure to a group of peers who all also 
have a history of felony drug offenses would increase his propensity to recidivate with a felony 
drug offense by 55 percentage points, relative to a mean of 9.1 percent of individuals who 
recidivate with a felony drug crime.  There are a variety of potential explanations for the 
particularly strong reinforcing peer effects estimated for felony drug crimes.  To the extent that 
some felony drug crimes involve the use rather than the distribution of drugs, exposure to peer 
drug offenders may make it more difficult for an individual to break an addiction and may even 
reinforce the addiction.  Moreover, because crime-specific human capital accumulation and 
network formation are likely to be particularly important for the distribution of drugs, exposure to 
peers with a history of drug felonies is likely to lead to large increases in an individual’s returns 
from felony drug crimes.  
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented in Table 4 helps to distinguish between the 
potential mechanisms through which individuals might be influenced by their peers.  The general 
pattern of this evidence is that exposure to peers with a history of having committed a particular 
offense has a much stronger influence on those individuals who already have some experience 
with that offense than it does for individuals with no prior experience.  One explanation that fits 
well with this pattern, especially for drug crimes, is that peers reinforce addictive behavior.   
Another explanation is that individuals may experience different returns from participation in 
                                                                                                                                                 
peers serving longer sentences are likely to be more serious offenders in unobserved ways, thereby 
affecting recidivism in the opposite direction.  
21 Additional specifications, not included in the paper, show that the strong evidence of peer effects seen for 
felony drug crimes is primarily being driven by felony non-marijuana drug crimes.  We also find evidence 
of reinforcing peer effects in the case of marijuana misdemeanor offenses. 
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  different types of crimes (or the legitimate sector of the economy) related to natural abilities, 
opportunities, human capital accumulation, involvement in crime networks, or other factors.  In 
this case, individuals who have a history of committing a particular offense have already revealed 
themselves to have high returns and, likely, substantial human capital related to this type of 
crime.  Consequently, access to peers who can increase the individual’s returns to this type of 
crime may lead to increased intensity of activity in this type of crime.  Access to peers who can 
increase returns for another type of crime may be much less valuable, as this may not decrease 
the gap in returns between crime categories enough to change an individual’s choice of type of 
crime.
22 
Before examining further specifications, it is important to stress that the evidence just 
presented regarding peer effects for each of the crime categories is based on a specification that 
includes a full set of peer criminal history characteristics, a number of other peer characteristics 
(such as age, age at first offense, and neighborhood characteristics), and a broad set of individual 
controls.  These full specifications are reported in Appendix Table 1.   
 
Age, Peer Effects, and Recidivism 
An additional pattern revealed by exploring the full set of parameter estimates shown in 
Appendix Table 1 is the positive correlation between the age of an individual’s peers and the 
individual’s propensity to recidivate in almost every crime category, even after controlling for a 
full set of peer criminal history measures.  This relationship is statistically significant in the cases 
of burglary and grand larceny.  To explore the role of age further, Tables 6 and 7 present two 
additional specifications that involve age interactions.  One might expect older individuals to 
exert stronger peer effects, and for these peer effects to have their largest impact on younger 
individuals, for at least two reasons.  First, younger individuals may be more impressionable and 
look towards their older peers as role models.  Second, younger individuals have probably 
accumulated less crime-specific human capital and are less likely to be tied into crime networks; 
as a result, they have more potential for additional gains from such knowledge or network ties.  
                                                 
22 We also explored the possibility that exposure to peers with certain criminal histories enables individuals 
to “graduate” to more serious crimes within a broad category of crimes.  We focused primarily on the broad 
category of drug crimes.  While many of the results are insignificant, we do find that individuals with a 
misdemeanor marijuana offense history are significantly more likely to recidivate with a felony non-
marijuana offense as result of exposure to peers with a felony non-marijuana offense history. 
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  Conversely, more experienced, older individuals have more crime-related knowledge to transfer 
and are more likely to help an individual get tied into an existing network.   
Table 6 reports parameter estimates for a series of regressions that relate recidivism with 
a particular offense type h to an individual’s own age at exit, the average age at exit of the 
individual’s peers, and the interaction of the two:   
 
                  () 01 2 *_ _
h
ij ij ij ij ij ij j ij R Age Peer age Peer age Age X γ γγ β =+ + + λ ε + +           (3) 
 
This regression also includes: (i) the full set of individual controls used in the initial regressions; 
(ii) a vector of basic peer characteristics including gender, neighborhood per capita income, 
neighborhood incarceration rate, age at first offense, and number of prior felonies; and (iii) 
interactions between these peer characteristics and the parallel individual characteristics.  Table 6 
reports estimates of γ0, γ1, and γ2 for each crime category.  The point estimates are unanimously 
positive for both individual and peer age and unanimously negative for the interaction of the two.  
This supports two broad conclusions: (i) criminal behavior increases with age, and (ii) older 
individuals exert stronger peer effects than younger individuals—exerting these peer effects 
almost exclusively on younger individuals.  The effect of exposure to older peers declines to zero 
as individuals approach adulthood.  Age plays a statistically significant role for almost all forms 
of theft, as older individuals are significantly more likely to recidivate with auto theft, burglary, 
and petty larceny offenses.  In addition, exposure to older peers significantly increases the 
propensity of younger individuals to recidivate with auto theft, burglary, grand larceny, and petty 
larceny offenses. 
  Table 7 presents results from a series of regressions that are identical to equation (2), 
except that they include additional interactions of age with the three variables of interest.  The 
clearest evidence that age influences crime-specific peer effects is seen for auto theft.  Younger 
individuals, both with and without a past history of auto theft, are significantly more likely than 
older individuals to commit auto theft as a result of exposure to peers who have a past history of 
auto theft.  The magnitude of the estimated positive peer effect for younger individuals 
significantly decreases as individuals get older; in fact, it declines so much that the average effect 
across all ages presented in Table 4 is indistinguishable from zero.  Likewise, younger 
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  individuals, regardless of their own history, are significantly more likely to commit robberies than 
older individuals when exposed to a greater proportion of peers who have committed robbery.
23  
Finally, younger individuals with a prior felony drug offense are significantly more likely to 
recidivate with a felony drug crime when exposed to a greater percentage of individuals with a 
prior history of having committed such a crime.  
Table 7 also provides broad evidence that specialization declines with age.  Specifically, 
the propensity of individuals with a prior history of an offense to recidivate with that offense 
significantly declines with age for felony drug crimes, burglary, robbery, and auto theft.  A 
potential explanation for this pattern could be that opportunities to accumulate human capital in 
certain crime categories increase with age or with past criminal experience in other categories. 
Individuals may face declining learning costs with age, especially for crimes (such as felony drug 
crimes) that younger individuals are not as likely to commit, as the total stock of criminal 
experience for individuals in their cohort increases.
24  Individuals may also begin to face harsher 
punishments as they repeat these more serious offenses at a later age.   
  
Robustness I: Refining Peer Measures 
  Thus far, we have defined an individual’s peer measures as a weighted average of the 
characteristics of all other individuals serving time in the correctional facility concurrently with 
this individual at some point during his sentence.  This definition potentially measures an 
individual’s peer exposure with error; this would occur if an individual does not actually interact 
with all of the individuals within a facility or interacts more intensely with certain individuals, 
biasing the estimated peer effects toward zero.
25  To explore this possibility, we present a number 
                                                 
23 Note that the total peer effect for individuals with a history of committing a given crime combines the 
direct peer effect and the effect associated with the interaction of peer and individual history of an offense. 
24 It is possible that an individual’s age also proxies for the total number of different crimes that an 
individual has committed.  In this way, the fact that specialization declines with age, for example, might 
simply signify that individuals are less likely to participate in any given category in which they have 
experience due to their having experience in more categories on average.  In the course of our empirical 
analysis, therefore, we also included variables for the total number of crime categories in which an 
individual has a history of participating and interactions of this variable with peer characteristics.  The 
coefficients on these additional variables were never significant and, somewhat surprisingly, had almost no 
impact on the effect of age and age interactions in the specification reported in Table 7. 
25 Identification of the appropriate peer group is a common problem in the peer effects literature.   
Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2002) find no evidence that peer groups are formed along racial lines in 
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  of additional specifications analogous to those shown in Table 4, but using alternative definitions 
of the peer group.  We report the key parameters of interest for these alternative specifications in 
the next four tables.  Table 8 reports the parameter estimates that result when the peer group is 
instead defined as individuals of the same race serving sentences in a facility concurrently.
26  
Table 9 restricts the sample to only facilities with an average of 20 or fewer individuals serving 
sentences concurrently, while Table 10 restricts the sample to only residential facilities.  Finally, 
Table 11 restricts the sample to only those individuals with a relatively long sentence length. 
  Redefining the peer group in accordance with an individual’s race would reduce 
measurement error in the peer variables if youths interact primarily with others of the same race 
while incarcerated.
27  Table 8 presents the results from estimating equation (2) with the redefined 
peer group.  For the most part, these results conform to the same qualitative pattern as the original 
specification presented in Table 4.  When race is used as the defining characteristic of the peer 
group, the resulting parameter estimates reveal statistically significant peer effects for individuals 
with a history of a particular crime category in the cases of burglary, petty larceny, felony drug 
offenses, misdemeanor drug offenses, and felony weapon offenses.  The magnitude of the 
coefficients on the interaction terms,  0 ˆ β , are very similar (sometimes smaller) to those presented 
in Table 4.  However, the t-statistics are generally greater, thereby ensuring that the effect for 
misdemeanor drug crimes is statistically significant in this case.  On the other hand, evidence of 
new activity in a crime category following exposure to peers with a prior history in that category 
disappears completely, as the formerly statistically significant results for felony sex offenses and 
robbery are no longer significant.  The overall weight of this evidence does not generally lead to 
the conclusion that the peer group is more precisely defined along racial lines. 
  Table 9 presents the results from estimating equation (2) for the sample of 4,266 
individuals in the 115 smallest facilities, with a maximum average size of 20 individuals serving 
                                                                                                                                                 
medical school, though they find some evidence that peer groups are formed along gender lines.  Similarly, 
Sacerdote (2000) examines whether peer effects among college students occur at the room or dorm level. 
26 Based on the DJJ’s classification system, race is defined according to three categories: white, black, and 
other. 
27 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may be the case.  A January 2003 MSNBC special on the San 
Quentin correctional facility in California, for example, stated that everyone in the prison belongs to a 
“gang,” generally comprised of people of the same race.  These gangs are racially segregated in that 
members of a gang primarily interact with each other during meals and exercise periods.   
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  time concurrently in these facilities.
28  One would expect there to be greater interaction between 
all youths in a facility with 10 individuals than in one with 100; thus, restricting the sample to 
smaller facilities ought to increase the precision of the measures of peer exposure. This 
specification strengthens the general pattern of the results—that the effect of peers on recidivism 
is significantly greater for individuals with a prior history of having committed the same offense.  
The interactions between an individual’s own experience with an offense and the intensity of 
exposure to peers with experience in that crime category are positive and statistically significant 
for robbery and grand larceny in this specification, as well as for burglary, petty larceny, and 
felony drug offenses.  As in the initial specification of Table 4, there is also a positive and 
significant coefficient on the exposure to peers who have committed a felony sex offense.  In 
comparison to the results obtained when using the entire sample of facilities, the magnitudes of 
the coefficients are generally greater for the portion of the sample assigned to relatively small 
facilities.  This suggests that the peer group is more precisely measured in relatively small 
facilities and that the coefficients estimated using the full sample are likely to understate the 
actual magnitudes of peer effects in correctional facilities. 
  One might also expect the original peer exposure measure to be more precise in 
residential facilities, as individuals committed to them have more time to interact with all of the 
other individuals in the same facility.  Table 10 presents the results for equation (2), restricting 
the sample to the 6,992 individuals in residential facilities.  The peer effect patterns are again very 
similar to the original results presented in Table 4.
29, 30  Lastly, we examine whether the average 
                                                 
28 One issue in looking at facility size is that we only know the number of individuals released from a 
facility as opposed to the number of individuals incarcerated in a facility.  Using the number of individuals 
released as a measure of facility size may be an inaccurate reflection of actual facility size since one may 
expect to see more releases from facilities with shorter sentences.  Thus, we create an index of facility size 
that equals the number of individuals released from a facility multiplied by the average sentence length in 
each facility.  These 4,266 individuals are from facilities with a facility size index less than 15,000. 
29 Note that all offenders serving time in Florida’s maximum security juvenile correctional facilities are 
kept in single cells; one might therefore expect there to be minimal peer interaction among these offenders.  
Yet, since there are only 15 juveniles under the age of seventeen in the maximum-security facilities, the 
results presented in Table 10 do not differ when these facilities are excluded from the estimation.  
30 We also ran these specifications for the sample of non-residential facilities, which includes 1,224 
individuals.  With the exception of felony drug offenses, peer effects in non-residential facilities do not 
appear to be reinforcing in nature.  Rather, the recidivism behavior of individuals without a history of 
burglary, grand larceny, misdemeanor drug offenses, or felony sex offenses is significantly impacted by 
their exposure to peers who have a history of these offenses.  The effect is positive for burglary and 
misdemeanor drug offenses and negative for grand larceny and felony sex offenses.  A potential 
explanation for this finding is that non-residential facilities contain younger, more inexperienced 
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  peer measures are more powerful for individuals who have relatively long sentence lengths and, 
consequently, are exposed to their peers for a longer period of time.  Of course, by the very fact 
that individuals serving longer sentences received these sentences in the first place, they have 
revealed themselves to be different than individuals serving shorter sentences.  With this in mind, 
we view these results as providing suggestive rather than conclusive evidence of the effect of 
longer peer exposure on the intensity of the peer effect.  Table 11 presents the results of 
estimating equation (2) for individuals with a sentence length of at least 155 days.  This includes 
slightly more than half of the sample.  In this case, the interaction of individual history and the 
peer measure continues to be positive and significant for individuals with a history of burglary, 
petty larceny, felony drug crimes, and felony weapon offenses, while exposure to peers with a 
history of robbery decreases the propensity for any individual to recidivate with robbery.  The 
primary difference from the original results presented in Table 4 is that there is no longer 
evidence of peer effects for felony sex offenses while there is in the case of auto theft—regardless 
of an individual’s own history, exposure to peers with a history of auto theft increases the 
propensity of the individual to recidivate with auto theft.  Possible explanations for the presence 
of peer effects related to auto theft in this case, while absent in other specifications, are that auto 
theft is a more difficult skill to learn while in a correctional facility or that auto theft networks 
require a more intense level of screening of potential candidates that can only be accomplished 
over a longer period of time.
31  
  In general, the results of these four specifications, which seek to define an individual’s 
peer exposure measure more accurately, imply that the results presented in Table 4 may 
understate the actual influence of an individual’s peers on his or her subsequent behavior.  Taken 
together, the specifications reported in Tables 8 through 11 suggest that peers are likely to 
influence criminal behavior in some form or another for all of the crime categories considered in 
this analysis.  
                                                                                                                                                 
individuals who have not accumulated substantial amounts of crime-specific human capital; thus, exposure 
to peers with criminal histories different from themselves may increase the returns to participating in a new 
criminal activity enough to cause the individual to switch activities. 
31 Ayres and Levitt (1998) describe the types of networks that exist in auto theft rings.  Stolen cars must be 
transferred from the individual who steals the car to a chop-shop or another appropriate sales outlet.  As in 
other forms of organized crime, such a transaction may require a level of confidence that the individual will 
not reveal the network if arrested.  
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Robustness II: Censoring and Measurement Error 
  To test the robustness of our measures of peer exposure to the measurement error 
associated with the censoring of the sample (the fact that we do not observe peers released before 
the beginning or after the end of our sample period), we estimate equation (2) using only those 
individuals who are released during the middle year of our sample, December 30, 1997 through 
December 30, 1998.  Because the average sentence length for the sample is less than six months, 
only a small portion of the peer exposure measure must be estimated for these individuals.  The 
estimated coefficients of interest for this regression are presented in Table 12.  The results are 
generally consistent with those presented for the entire sample in Table 4, continuing to reveal: (i) 
a positive coefficient on the interaction between individual criminal history and peer experience 
in the crime categories of burglary, petty larceny, and felony drug offenses; (ii) statistically 
significant evidence of increases in new activity only for the case of sex crimes; and (iii) 
statistically significant evidence of decreases in new activity only for the case of robbery.  The 
coefficient on the interaction between individual and peer experience with an offense becomes 
statistically significant for misdemeanor drug offenses and dips just below statistical significance 
for felony weapon offenses.  Compared to the results obtained using the entire sample, the 
magnitude of the coefficients related to peer characteristics is somewhat larger in the cases of 
burglary, robbery, misdemeanor drug offenses, and felony sex offenses and somewhat smaller or 
almost identical in the cases of petty larceny and felony drug offenses.  As a whole, this 
specification suggests that while the measures of peer exposure for individuals released towards 
the beginning and the end of the sample contain some measurement error, the bias associated with 
this measurement error is not sufficient to conceal the general pattern of results. 
 
V. Policy  Considerations 
Given the strong and robust evidence of reinforcing peer effects in correctional facilities, 
two policy-related issues merit further examination: the optimal assignment of individuals to 
facilities and how peer quality is distributed across individuals and facilities.  With regards to 
optimal assignment, our results point to two broad conclusions.  First, because the social 
interactions estimated in juvenile correctional facilities flow more readily from older to younger 
  23 
  individuals, assignment policies that aim to reduce the exposure of young individuals to their 
older peers may substantially diminish the transference of crime-related human capital from one 
cohort to the next.  Second, the evidence presented in this paper overwhelmingly supports the 
notion that exposure to peers with experience in a particular crime category has its greatest effect 
on individuals who themselves already have some experience in that category.  Given these 
results, a policy of optimal assignment should generally involve grouping individuals with others 
of similar age but not with others who have a history of committing the same crimes.    
To examine whether Florida’s assignment of individuals to facilities is generally in line 
with these recommendations, we return to Table 1, which in addition to reporting means and 
overall standard deviations for each variable also reports the standard deviation within facilities 
(eliminating that part of the variation resulting from variation across facilities).  As the figures in 
the table clearly demonstrate, almost all of the variation in individual experience in each crime 
category is within facilities rather than across facilities.  This implies that Florida does not 
generally isolate individuals who have committed a particular offense, such as a drug offense, in 
specific facilities.  The average age of individuals in a facility, on the other hand, does vary 
significantly across facilities, as the standard deviation of age within facilities is 0.87 as opposed 
to 1.10 overall.  Thus, the evidence suggests that Florida’s facility assignment mechanism is 
fairly consistent with a policy aimed at reducing the impact of peer effects in correctional 
facilities.  
The second policy-related issue we consider is how peer quality is distributed across 
individuals and facilities.  Specifically, we explore two types of questions: Are individuals with 
certain demographic or criminal history characteristics more likely to be exposed to a better or 
worse peer group?  And to what extent is peer quality correlated with facility characteristics such 
as security level or management type (e.g., private for-profit, private nonprofit, or publicly 
operated)?   
  While one could directly examine the distribution of peers across facilities on the basis of 
any given observable characteristic, we seek to summarize how all the characteristics of one’s 
peers contribute to the propensity to commit particular crimes.  To this end, we construct a 
measure for each facility that summarizes the average impact of the peers in that facility on 
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  recidivism of each type of crime.  In other words, we use the estimated coefficients from the 
regression described by equation (2), and presented in Appendix Table 1, to calculate 
 
                           ( ) 01 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ *_ _
hh h
j j j jj
h
R Peer offense P Offense Peer offense β βα =+ +                       (4) 
 
ˆ h
j R  is the average effect of peer characteristics on recidivism with crime category h in facility j.  
To provide a single summary measure of the impact of peers on crime in general, we also create a 
total crime index, which is a weighted average of  ˆ h
j R  across the nine crime categories.  For 
weights, we use the average sentence length associated with committing each crime, which 
captures to some degree the seriousness of the crime.  Felony sex offenses, robbery, and felony 
weapon offenses receive the three largest weights, respectively.
32 
  We then regress the estimated peer effect for crime category h,  ˆ h
j R , on a vector of 
individual and facility characteristics: 
 
                                                             ˆ h
j ij j ij R XF β δε = ++                                                         (5) 
 
The vector of individual characteristics, Xij, includes demographic, criminal history, and 
neighborhood variables; these variables are identical to those included in equation (2).  Fj 
contains two sets of dummy variables—the first indicates the risk level associated with the 
facility, and the second indicates whether the facility is publicly managed by the state, publicly 
managed by a county,
33 or privately managed by either a nonprofit or for-profit corporation.  A 
significant and positive coefficient on an individual characteristic implies that this characteristic 
predicts the assignment to facilities with peers who, on average, increase the propensity to 
recidivate with a particular crime.  Similarly, a significant and positive coefficient on a facility 
characteristic implies that this type of facility generally contains worse peers.  The results from 
                                                 
32 Appendix Table 2 displays the regression used to determine the average sentence length associated with 
each of the nine crime categories.  Sentence length is regressed on individual characteristic variables, 
dummy variables for the most recent crime committed, and dummy variables for whether a particular crime 
was committed in the past.  All variables are constructed to have mean zero.  The weight on felony drug 
crimes, for example, is then equal to the constant plus the coefficient on having committed a felony drug 
crime as the most recent offense.  The weights are normalized such that their sum is equal to one. 
33 All county-operated facilities in Florida are boot camps.  They are managed directly by their counties’ 
sheriff’s departments, with oversight from the DJJ. 
  25 
  this estimation, for each of the nine crime categories and the total crime index, are presented in 
Table 13. 
  A number of interesting and significant patterns stand out.  First, females are more likely 
to be exposed to bad peers overall and in six of the nine crime categories.  However, females are 
exposed to peers who decrease the propensity to recidivate with the more serious crimes of felony 
drug offenses, felony weapon offenses, and felony sex offenses.  A leading potential explanation 
for this pattern is that the majority of facilities are single-sex and there are many more male 
facilities than female ones.  Due to these constraints, Florida may be unable to optimally allocate 
females to facilities.  For example, there may be an insufficient number of single-sex facilities to 
adequately group female offenders by age.
34  Race, on the other hand, is not systematically 
related to peer quality.  This result holds whether or not facility characteristics are included in the 
regression.
35 
  Table 13 also shows that age is significantly and positively correlated with assignment to 
bad peers for six of the nine crime categories and the total crime index.  Having a felony sex 
offense history or a history of escapes significantly increases exposure to peers who increase an 
individual’s overall propensity to recidivate, while a history of grand larceny significantly 
decreases such exposure.  In the case of felony sex offenses, much of this effect is attributable to 
the fact that these individuals are often assigned to particular, specialized facilities, where these 
serious offenders are exposed to one another.   
  Facility type, especially risk level, also plays a significant role in determining the quality 
of an individual’s peers.  Relative to assignment to a minimum risk facility, assignment to high 
and maximum risk facilities significantly increases exposure to bad peers for all types of crimes 
and the total crime index, while assignment to a moderate risk facility increases exposure to bad 
peers for every type of crime category except auto theft, burglary, and grand larceny.  This 
finding fits with that of Chen and Shapiro (2003), which provides evidence based on a regression 
                                                 
34 We explored this possibility by including an interaction between gender and age in equation (5).  The 
coefficient on the interaction is negative and significant for almost all types of crimes and the total crime 
index, while that on female is positive and significant in almost all cases.  This implies that young girls are 
exposed to much worse peers on average than are young boys—certainly a downside to segregation across 
facilities on the basis of gender. 
35 In fact, the inclusion of facility characteristics does not change the qualitative nature of the results for any 
of the individual characteristics. 
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  discontinuity design that assignment to higher risk facilities leads to an increased propensity to 
recidivate for adults.  While not directly comparable, the results presented here imply that Chen 
and Shapiro’s results may be driven in part by increased exposure to bad peers in higher risk 
facilities.  We also find that, relative to state-operated facilities, assignment to a private nonprofit 
facility significantly decreases exposure to bad peers in the cases of felony sex offenses, grand 
larceny, and overall crime; assignment to for-profit facilities, on the other hand, significantly 
increases exposure to bad peers in the cases of felony drug offenses and petty larceny. 
 
VI. Conclusion   
    Taken as a whole, these results provide strong evidence of the existence of peer effects in 
juvenile correctional facilities.  In many instances, these peer effects have a reinforcing nature, 
whereby exposure to peers with a history of committing a particular crime increases the 
probability that an individual who has already committed the same type of crime recidivates with 
that crime.  This form of a reinforcing peer effect is positive and significant for the cases of 
burglary, felony drug offenses, felony weapon offenses, and felony sex offenses in our main 
specification and for auto theft, grand larceny, petty larceny, misdemeanor drug offenses, and 
robbery in alternative specifications that refine the peer measure in various ways.  There is much 
less evidence that exposure to peers with particular criminal histories increases an individual’s 
propensity to recidivate in a crime category with which the individual has no prior experience, as 
the corresponding coefficient is positive and significant for only felony sex offenses in our main 
specification and negative and significant for robbery.    
    In addition, we find strong evidence of specialization—for every crime category, having 
a history of committing a particular crime increases the likelihood that an individual will 
recidivate with that crime.  The results also provide strong evidence that older individuals exert 
stronger peer effects than younger individuals, in part because of their more extensive criminal 
experience, and they exert these peer effects more intensely on younger individuals. 
    The magnitudes of the estimated peer effects are generally greater when we limit the 
sample to individuals in relatively small facilities, to individuals in residential facilities, or to 
individuals with relatively long sentence lengths.  The results also appear robust to the 
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  measurement error that arises because some peers are released either before or after the sample 
period, which requires a portion of the peer measure to be estimated in these cases. 
    While we do not attempt to distinguish explicitly between the many potential 
mechanisms through which individuals might influence their peers, a few mechanisms do seem 
particularly capable of explaining the general pattern of our results (primarily the result that 
exposure to peers with a history of having committed a particular offense has a much stronger 
influence on those individuals who already have some experience with that offense).  One 
explanation that fits well with this pattern is that peers reinforce addictive behavior, which may 
explain part of the large reinforcing peer effect for felony drug crimes.  Another explanation is 
that individuals may experience different rates of return from participation in various types of 
legitimate or illegitimate activities; this variation in returns could be related to natural abilities, 
opportunities, human capital accumulation, or involvement in criminal networks.  In this case, 
individuals who have a history of committing a particular offense have already revealed 
themselves to have high returns and, likely, substantial human capital related to this type of 
crime.  Access to peers who can disseminate additional crime-specific knowledge or aid in the 
expansion of a criminal network may increase the individual’s returns to this type of crime, 
leading him to increase the intensity of his activity in it.  On the other hand, access to peers who 
can increase returns for another type of crime may be unhelpful, as this may not decrease the gap 
in returns between crime types enough to change an individual’s choice of type of crime.  Other 
potential social mechanisms related to stigma or to the general spread of information do not fit the 
pattern of our estimated peer effects as well. 
    The results of our analysis also provide insight into the distribution of exposure to peer 
quality across individuals and facilities.  Not surprisingly, older individuals and those with more 
extensive criminal histories (in some dimensions) tend to be exposed to worse peers.  More 
surprisingly, females tend to be exposed to worse peers on average.  This effect is almost entirely 
driven by the fact that the assignment of juvenile females to correctional facilities, in an effort to 
place them in single-sex facilities, often results in an increased exposure to older (female) 
individuals than is the case for juvenile males.  Thus, one consequence of the fact that juvenile 
crime is primarily a male activity (85 percent of the individuals in our sample are male) is that 
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  Florida may have a hard time isolating juvenile females in single-sex facilities with individuals of 
an appropriate age.  This problem is likely to be even greater in smaller states.      
    These results have several broad policy implications.  First, in the broadest sense, the 
existence of peer effects in juvenile criminal behavior suggests that any current reduction in crime 
leads, at least through the correctional system channel, to future reductions in crime by reducing 
the overall level of crime-related human capital.  It is important to account for these dynamic 
benefits when considering the overall benefits of reducing crime in a given period.  Notice that 
this does not imply a good course of action would be to lock up more juveniles for the purposes 
of deterring crime, as the intense exposure of juvenile offenders to one another in correctional 
facilities may, through the variety of channels discussed in this paper, increase the amount of 
criminal behavior upon release.
36  However, other programs for reducing juvenile crime—so long 
as they do not increase the intensity of juvenile offenders’ exposure to one another or so long as 
they maintain a controlled social environment—might have dynamic benefits that greatly enhance 
the short-term benefits derived from the decreased criminal behavior of program participants. 
    A second broad conclusion of our analysis concerns the mixing of older and younger 
individuals, both in juvenile correctional facilities and in other social settings.  Because the social 
interactions estimated in juvenile correctional facilities flow almost exclusively from older to 
younger individuals, policies aimed at reducing the exposure of young individuals to their older 
peers, especially in high crime-risk environments, may substantially diminish the transference of 
crime-related human capital from one cohort to the next and thereby reduce the aggregate amount 
of crime-related knowledge in society.  In this way, the greater segregation of juveniles on the 
basis of age in juvenile correctional facilities, schools, or other social settings might have 
important dynamic effects in reducing crime. 
Finally, the evidence presented in this paper overwhelmingly supports the notion that 
exposure to peers with experience in a particular crime category has its greatest effect on 
individuals who themselves already have some experience in that category.  Thus, while a policy 
of grouping offenders with others who have committed the same crimes may seem prudent to 
                                                 
36 Our paper does not explicitly provide any evidence that the intensity of peer effects is greater inside a 
correctional facility than on the outside, but one might certainly imagine that this is the case. 
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  prevent the learning of new crimes, such a policy may inadvertently increase human capital 
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Appendix 
This appendix describes the exact procedure we use to calculate the peer characteristics 
used in the analysis.  More specifically, when calculating an individual i’s peer exposure, we 
allow each observed potential peer, j, in the facility to contribute to this measure in two ways—
directly and indirectly.  A potential peer contributes directly to the peer measure if his sentence 
actually overlaps with individual i’s sentence, in which case, we weight the relevant peer 
characteristic, cj, by the number of days that individual i is exposed to the j
th peer, dij.  A potential 
peer also contributes indirectly to the peer measure in certain circumstances, leading to an 
additional weight, wij, on the relevant peer characteristic.  This weight is based on the fraction of 
sentences of the length served by the potential peer j that would not have been observed for those 
peers who overlap with the individual.  In this way, peer exposure to characteristic cj is calculated 
by the following equation 
 














Exp                                                    (A1) 
 
We estimate wij by calculating the expected number of days that individual i is exposed to 
an individual with a sentence the length of individual j’s who would have been released either 
before or after the sample period.  In doing so, we make the assumption that each facility is in a 
steady state with respect to the peers served over the relevant period and that the release date of 
each individual is randomly distributed across the sample period.  The calculation of wij is best 
understood by considering an example.  Consider individual i released 30 days after the sample 
period begins, having served a sentence of 150 days.  Additionally, consider a peer, j, in the same 
facility with a sentence of 50 days.  This information is depicted in the following diagram, where 
the horizontal axis represents time, t, and the vertical axis represents the number of days 
individual i would be exposed to peer j if peer j is released at date t. 
 
Scenario 1:    date_release[i] <= days_in[i] - days_in[j] 
Example: date_release[i] = 30; days_in[i] = 150; days_in[j] = 50 
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Any individuals who are released before t = 0 will be unobserved in the sample.  To calculate the 
average number of days that individual i is expected to have been exposed to individual j, we 
simply divide the area of the shaded region by 729 (the number of days in the observed sample).  
To see this more clearly, imagine, for example, that one individual with a 50-day sentence is 
released during the sample period.  In this case, the probability that such an individual was also 
released in the 120 days before the sample period is 120/729 and the average exposure of 
individual i to this individual is simply the average height of the shaded region.  Thus, the correct 
weight for individual j, wij, is simply the area of the shaded region (length * average height) 
divided by 729.   
This example depicts the correction made for just one case of pre-censoring.  For peers 
with very long sentences, pre-censoring can occur such that the unobserved region is just the 
shaded triangular portion of the diagram above.  Similarly, there are two cases of post-censoring 
that parallel those of pre-censoring.  The following are examples and diagrams that depict the 
three additional censoring scenarios.  In each scenario, wij is set equal to the area of the shaded 
region divided by 729.   
 
Scenario 2:    days_in[i] - days_in[j] < date_release[i] <= days_in[i] 
Example: date_release[i] = 30; days_in[i] = 150; days_in[j] = 160   
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Scenario 3:    days_in[j] >= 729 - date_release[i] +  days_in[i] 
Example: date_release[i] = 700; days_in[i] = 50; days_in[j] = 100 
 
 
Scenario 4:    729 - date_release[i] <= days_in[j] <= 729 - date_release[i] + days_in[i] 
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  Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variable N  Mean  Overall Within  Definition 
Recidivism        
Recidivism  8216  .67  .47  .45  1 if client recidivated within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Felony Drug  8216  .093  .29  .28  1 if client committed felony drug offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Misd. Drug  8216  .090  .29  .28  1 if client committed misd. drug offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Felony Weapon  8216  .14  .34  .34  1 if client committed felony weapon offense within one year of release, 0 
otherwise 
R_Felony Sex  8216  .013  .11  .11  1 if client committed felony sex offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Auto Theft  8216  .093  .29  .28  1 if client committed auto theft offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Burglary  8216  .14  .34  .33  1 if client committed burglary offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Grand Larceny  8216  .094  .29  .29  1 if client committed grand larceny offense within one year of release, 0 
otherwise 
R_Petty Larceny  8216  .12  .32  .32  1 if client committed petty larceny offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Robbery  8216  .045  .21  .20  1 if client committed robbery offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
         
Facility Characteristics 
       
# Individuals in Facility per day  14421  48.7  73.5  0  Calculated as number of individuals released multiplied by avg. sentence length 
in the facility, divided by 729 (total number of sample days) 
# Released  14421  196.5  240.5  0  # of individuals released from each facility 
Min Risk  14421  .15  .36  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated minimum risk, 0 otherwise 
Low Risk  14421  .17  .38  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated low risk, 0 otherwise 
Mod Risk  14421  .49  .50  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated moderate risk, 0 otherwise 
High Risk  14421  .17  .38  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated high risk, 0 otherwise 
Max Risk  14421  .010  .099  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated maximum risk, 0 otherwise 
Nonprofit Mgt  14421  .54  .50  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is managed by a private nonprofit 
organization, 0 otherwise 
For-profit Mgt  14421  .15  .36  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is managed by a private for-profit 
organization, 0 otherwise 
County Mgt  14421  .091  .29  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is publicly managed by the county, 0 
otherwise 
State Mgt  14421  .22  .41  0  1 if facility to which client is assigned is publicly managed by the state, 0 
otherwise 
         
Individual Characteristics 
       
Female  8216  .14 .35 .19  1  if  client is female, 0 otherwise 
Black  8216  .48  .50  .48  1 if client is black, 0 otherwise 
Age First Offense  8216  12.7  2.0  1.8  Client’s age in years at first adjudicated criminal offense 
Age Exit  8216  15.7  1.0  .87  Client’s age in years at exit from facility 
Days In  8216  168.5  106.4  64.0  Number of days an individual is in facility 
         
Individual Criminal History Characteristics 
    
Felonies  8216  4.7 4.6 4.1  Number  of  felony charges on client’s record 
Fel Drug  8216  .13  .33  .32  1 if any felony drug charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Mis Drug  8216  .16  .37  .36  1 if any misd. drug charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Fel Sex  8216  .067  .25  .24  1 if any felony sex offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Mis Sex  8216  .0095  .097  .096  1 if any misd. sex offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Fel Weap  8216  .37  .48  .47  1 if any felony weapon offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Mis Weap  8216  .042  .20  .20  1 if any misd. weapon offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Auto Theft  8216  .26  .44  .16  1 if any auto theft charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Grlrcn  8216  .35  .48  .46  1 if any grand larceny charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Plrcn  8216  .61  .49  .48  1 if any petty larceny charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Burglary  8216  .58  .49  .47  1 if any burglary charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Robbery  8216  .13  .33  .32  1 if any robbery charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Escape  8216  .077  .27  .25  1 if any escape charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Vandalism  8216  .31  .46  .45  1 if any vandalism charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Disorder  8216  .093  .29  .29  1 if any disorderly conduct charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Other  8216  .92  .27  .26  1 if any other charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
         
Individual Neighborhood Characteristics 
 
Youth Crime Rate in Zip   8216  358  260  247  Total number of juvenile referrals in client’s home zip code, FY 2000-01 
% Own Race in Zip   8216  .60  .33  .32  % of inhabitants in client’s home zip code of same racial group as client, 1990 
Per-Cap Inc Race   8216  10710  4331  4180  Median per-capita income of client’s racial group in client’s home zip code, 1990 
Unemployment Rate   8216  .068  .028  .027  % unemployment rate in client’s home zip code, 1990 
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  Incarcerated in Zip   8216  109  307  301  Number of people incarcerated in client’s home zip code, 1990 
Per-Cap Income   8216  12316  3661  3533  Median per-capita income in home zip code, 1990 
         
Peer Demographic Characteristics     
 
Peer_male  8216  .86  .29  .038  Weighted average of whether or not an individual’s peers are male 
Peer_age_exit 8216  16.4  .88  .22  Weighted  average  of the age at exit of an individual’s peers  
Peer_age1st  8216  13.1  .81  .32  Weighted average of the age at first offense of an individual’s peers  
         
Peer Criminal History Characteristics   
 
Peer_fel  8216  4.7  2.1  .63  Weighted average of the number of felony charges of an individual’s peers  
Peer_fel_drg  8216  .16  .10  .053  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any felony 
drug offenses 
Peer_mis_drg  8216  .19  .11  .065  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any misd. 
drug offenses 
Peer_fel_sex  8216  .069 .097 .038  Weighted  average  of  whether an individual’s peers have a record of any felony 
sex offenses 
Peer_mis_sex  8216  .010 .023 .016  Weighted  average  of  whether  an individual’s peers have a record of any misd. sex 
offenses 
Peer_fel_wpn  8216  .37  .14  .075  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any felony 
weapon offenses 
Peer_mis_wpn  8216  .042 .038 .028  Weighted  average  of  whether an individual’s peers have a record of any misd. 
weapon offenses 
Peer_auto  8216  .27  .14  .066  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of auto theft 
Peer_glrcn  8216  .35  .13  .077  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of grand larceny 
Peer_plrcn  8216  .61  .12  .081  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of petty larceny 
Peer_burg  8216  .57  .16  .079  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of burglary 
Peer_rob  8216  .13  .11  .051  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of robbery 
Peer_vand  8216  .30  .11  .070  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of vandalism 
Peer_dsord  8216  .090 .069 .048  Weighted  average  of  whether  an individual’s peers have a record of disorderly 
conduct 
Peer_escp  8216  .077 .093 .039  Weighted  average  of  whether an individual’s peers have a record of escape 
Peer_other  8216  .92  .074  .048  Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of other 
offenses 
         
Peer Neighborhood Characteristics     
 
Peer_percapi  8216  10754  1988  810  Weighted average of the per-capita income in an individual’s peers’ zip codes 
Peer_percorin  8216  93  65  42  Weighted average of the number of incarcerated people in an individual’s peers’ 
zip codes 
    NOTE.—Neighborhood characteristics are constructed for Florida zip codes only.  Individuals with zip codes from other states are assigned a zero for all 
neighborhood characteristics, and a dummy variable denoting that an individual has an out-of-state zip code of residence is included in all regressions.  This 
allows us to maintain the full sample for the regressions, and it controls for the potential problem that out-of-state youths are less likely to recidivate in Florida.
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  Table 2a.  Correlations between Peer Variables and Individual Variables 
                       
    Black  Female  AgeExit  Age 1
st  # Fel.  Fel Sex  Mis Sex Fel Drug Mis Drug Auto Thef Burglary  Grlrcn  Plrcn  Robbery Escape  Vandal  Disorder Fel Weap Mis Weap 
Peer_male                                    .0329* -.8356* .0597* -.0571* .1585* .0869* .0048 .1157* .1019* .0552* .1906* .1001* .0332* .0943* -.0574* .0965* -.0079 .0124 .0253* 
Peer_age_exit                                       
                                       
                                       
                                     
                                     
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                     
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                     
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
.0065 -.0794* .5055* .1479* .1771* .0322* .0015 .1012* .0789* .1078* .0388* .0599* .0186* .0906* .0662* .0099 .0084 .0460* .0231*
Peer_percapi .0407* .0066 .0510* .0238* -.0010 -.0230* .0060 .0501* .0421* .0293* -.0169* -.0250* -.0159 .0421* .0093 -.0107 .0415* .0034 .0014
Peer_percorin
   
.0463* -.0369* .0784* -.0071 .0774* .0230* -.0001 .0508* .0218* .0404* .0144 .0405* .0240* .0474* .0500* .0438* .0266* .0333* .0039
Peer_age1st
 
-.0771* .1459* .2273* .2399* -.1830* -.0627* -.0232* -.0204* .0350* -.0739* -.1049* -.0658* -.0522* -.0979* -.0926* -.0798* -.0270* -.1165* -.0226*
Peer_fel .1077* -.2844* .2162* -.1294* .4176* .0881* .0215* .1273* .0428* .2060* .1874* .1627* .0780* .2353* .1842* .1148* .0442* .1873* .0441*
Peer_fel_sex .0133 -.2031* .0515* -.0657* .1273* .3030* .0304* .0084 -.0153 .0182* .0308* .0231* -.0151 .0435* .0425* .0248* -.0116 .0366* .0051
Peer_mis_sex .0222* -.0451* -.0218* -.0384* .0641* .0565* .0063 .0083 -.0283* .0377* .0171* .0156 .0013 .0556* .0372* .0208* .0191* .0306* .0033
Peer_fel_drg .0776* -.3310* .2007* -.0177* .1994* -.0042 .0020 .1670* .1178* .1304* .1286* .0919* .0525* .1232* .0652* .0697* .0400* .0769* .0246*
Peer_mis_drg .0021 -.3123* .1739* .0504* .0645* -.0248* -.0174* .1239* .1320* .0436* .0731* .0490* .0373* .0344* -.0317* .0247* .0013 -.0009 .0145*
Peer_fel_wpn .1033* -.0242* .0949* -.1232* .2868* .0364* .0131 .0722* .0032 .1590* .1056* .0878* .0551* .1710* .1703* .0700* .0446* .1855* .0308*
Peer_mis_wpn
 
.0282* -.0989* .0702* -.0318* .1062* .0013 -.0045 .0418* .0212* .0660* .0503* .0419* .0234* .0654* .0384* .0430* .0358* .0430* .0053*
Peer_auto .0821* -.1374* .2053* -.0702* .3019* .0062 .0178* .1194* .0425* .2056* .1409* .1174* .0441* .2034* .1478* .0687* .0389* .1503* .0416*
Peer_burg .0552* -.4934* .0716* -.1135* .2709* .0209* .0062 .1180* .0669* .1407* .2078* .1366* .0746* .1651* .0733* .1026* .0230* .1062* .0326*
Peer_glrcn .0415* -.3021* .1303* -.0805* .2732* .0189* .0114 .0965* .0531* .1377* .1595* .1506* .0854* .1202* .0729* .0936* .0258* .0992* .0315*
Peer_plrcn
 
.0343* -.1056* .0381* -.0854* .1529* -.0300* .0028 .0683* .0453* .0601* .1042* .0959* .0891* .0701* .0721* .0662* .0234* .0753* .0183*
Peer_rob .1265* -.2387* .1442* -.0942* .3187* .0371* .0257* .1030* .0290* .1879* .1536* .0987* .0452* .2435* .1422* .0820* .0477* .1549* .0379*
Peer_escp .0914* .1319* .1192* -.0887* .2559* .0384* .0226* .0636* -.0174* .1407* .0694* .0675* .0465* .1486* .2764* .0491* .0405* .1484* .0225*
Peer_vand .0381* -.3335* .0251* -.1135* .2117* .0382* .0104 .0806* .0380* .0825* .1317* .1071* .0680* .1084* .0648* .0941* .0262* .0777* .0390*
Peer_dsord .0416* .0433* .0225* -.0335* .0903* -.0331* .0169* .0493* .0087 .0513* .0246* .0348* .0192* .0685* .0529* .0284* .0737* .0607* .0312*
Peer_other .0310* -.0122 .0587* -.0393* .1166* -.0828* -.0008 .0685* .0318* .0873* .0677* .0583* .0657* .0730* .0857* .0605* .0405* .0728* .0184*
NOTE.—*  indicates that the correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level or better. 
 
Table 2b.  Correlations between Fixed Effects-Transformed Peer Variables and Individual Variables 
                       
    Black  Female  AgeExit  Age 1
st  # Fel.  Fel Sex  Mis Sex Fel Drug Mis Drug Auto Thef Burglary  Grlrcn  Plrcn  Robbery Escape  Vandal  Disorder Fel Weap Mis Weap 
Peer_male                                    .0148 -.0542* .0004 -.0033 -.0001 .0057 -.0016 -.0025 .0094 .0093 -.0061 -.0045 .0002 -.0018 -.0008 .0028 -.0128 .0110 .0011 
Peer_age_exit                                       
                                       
                                     
                                       
                                     
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                     
                                     
                                       
                                       
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                       
                                       
                                       
-.0042 .0012 -.0137 -.0191* -.0006 .0037 -.0010 .0081 -.0051 -.0076 .0030 -.0101 .0011 -.0041 .0057 .0009 .0020 .0013 .0000
Peer_percapi -.0055 .0009 -.0075 .0050 -.0032 -.0048 .0047 -.0036 .0079 -.0046 .0019 .0032 -.0190* -.0012 .0002 .0027 -.0054 -.0077 -.0042
Peer_percorin .0030 .0055 .0100 -.0028 .0085 .0067 -.0110 .0082 .0109 -.0000 -.0033 .0066 .0150 .0043 .0231* .0093 .0041 .0010 -.0037 
Peer_age1st
 
.0002 .0034 -.0150 -.0677* .0066 .0164 -.0029 -.0069 .0042 .0026 .0154 .0087 .0074 .0069 .0117 .0101 .0049 .0111 -.0091 
Peer_fel .0187* -.0012 .0052 .0107 -.0305* .0107 .0002 -.039 .0039 -.0101 -.0177* -.0020 .0014 .0105 .0279* -.0189* .0014 .0096 -.0098
Peer_fel_sex -.0001 -.0045 .0047 .0187* .0081 -.0492* -.0057 .0020 .0074 -.0015 .0074 .0037 .0107 .0010 -.0029 .0017 -.0094 .0018 .0070
Peer_mis_sex .0028 .0018 -.0007 .0069 .0067 -.0050 -.0945* .0050 -.0205* .0017 -.0061 .0056 .0041 .0036 .0006 .0063 .0097 .0008 -.0043
Peer_fel_drg -.0166* .0007 .0065 -.0051 .0031 .0048 .0034 -.0818* -.0097 -.0103 .0103 .0148 .0148 -.0094 .0079 -.0002 .0088 .0066 -.0072
Peer_mis_drg -.0099 -.0050 .0049 .0110 -.0005 .0074 -.0171* -.0066 -.0488* -.0104 .0004 .0032 -.0003 -.0038 -.0107 -.0047 -.0005 -.0036 .0003
Peer_fel_wpn -.0045
 
-.0082 .0034 .0119 .0098 .0006 .0000 .0010 -.0034 .0131 .0103 .0103 .0136 -.0088 .0226* -.0063 .0119 -.0652* -.0092
Peer_mis_wpn
 
.0089 .0015 -.0029 -.0105 -.0071 .0066 -.0043 -.0047 -.0048 .0031 -.0122 .0026 .0068 -.0070 -.0115 .0078 .0096 -.0132 -.0913*
Peer_auto -.0107 -.0048 -.0024 .0025 -.0109 .0031 .0011 -.0111 -.0111 -.0674* -.0067 .0120 -.0048 .0141 .0197* .0074 -.0069 .0010 .0018
Peer_burg .0055 .0033 .0038 .0122 -.0197* .0047 .0003 .0107 .0079 -.0083 -.0638* -.0333* -.0006 .0065 .0222* -.0200* -.0050 .0089 -.0127
Peer_glrcn .0101 .0055 -.0073 .0023 -.0058 .0041 .0039 .0083 .0032 .0103 -.0323* -.0602* -.0019 -.0034 .0036 -.0075 -.0006 .0095 .0031
Peer_plrcn .0169* .0012 .0018 .0050 -.0041 .0085 .0022 .0160* .0014 -.0083 .0051 -.0065 -.0613* .0113 .0124 .0010 -.0002 .0109 .0049 
Peer_rob -.0106 -.0010 .0032 .0092 .0150 .0005 .0018 -.0055 .0022 .0202* .0053 .0028 .0127 -.0658* .0306* .0034 -.0007 -.0063 -.0036 
Peer_escp .0044 -.0030 .0100 .0139 .0144 .0008 -.0044 .0023 -.0090 .0127 .0230* .0098 .0116 .0268* -.0240* .0027 -.0131 .0131 -.0114 
Peer_vand .0060 -.0039 .0022 .0080 -.0187* .0071 .0021 .0010 .0023 .0091 -.0190* -.0035 .0074 .0032 .0036 -.0867* -.0012 -.0150 .0116
Peer_dsord .0035 .0035 .0006 .0066 .0048 -.0072 .0157 .0047 .0032 -.0030 -.0059 .0028 -.0077 -.0028 -.0114 -.0034 -.0589* .0105 .0092
Peer_other .0079 .0024 .0057 .0147 -.0091 -.0053 -.0057 -.0015 -.0095 .0118 -.0011 -.0157 .0049 .0163 -.0023 .0080 -.0103 .0053 -.0044
    NOTE.—Peer variables have undergone fixed effect transformations (that is, facility averages have been subtracted out).  * indicates that the correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level or better.
  38Table 3.  Individual Characteristic Determinants of Overall Recidivism   
Dependent Var. =  Recidivism 
 (1)  (2) 
-.11** -.11**  Female 
4.12 3.93 
.13** .13**  Black 
7.20 7.22 
-.045** -.045**  Age Exit 
7.07 7.11 
-.0067** -.0064*  Age First Offense 
2.02 1.94 
.000073 .000071  Days In 
0.92 0.89 
.0015 .0015  Felonies 
1.01 1.03 
-.050** -.053**  Fel Sex 
2.32 2.44 
.058 .060  Mis Sex 
1.27 1.32 
.057** .056**  Fel Drug 
3.80 3.79 
.031** .031**  Mis Drug 
2.24 2.29 
.023** .024**  Fel Weap 
2.06 2.17 
-.036 -.034  Mis Weap 
1.43 1.39 
.055** .054**  Auto Theft 
4.54 4.49 
-.0049 -.0049  Grlrcn 
0.41 0.41 
.033** .034**  Plrcn 
3.00 3.05 
.013 .014  Burglary 
1.06 1.11 
.028* .028*  Robbery 
1.91 1.91 
.030* .029  Escape 
1.66 1.62 
.017 .017  Vandalism 
1.45 1.53 
.043** .041**  Disorder 
2.62 2.51 
.14** .14**  Other 
6.58 6.53 
.0054** .0055**  Youth Crime Rate in Zip 
2.42 2.49 
-.017 -.017  % Own Race in Zip 
0.65 0.66 
.0038* .0038*  Per-Cap Inc Race 
1.89 1.89 
.10 .086  Unemployment Rate 
0.41 0.35 
.0011 .0011  Incarcerated in Zip 
0.64 0.65 
1.5** 1.1**  Constant 
3.31 11.11 
# observations  8216  8216 
Detailed peer list  YES  NO 
R
2 .1263  .1252 
    NOTE.—The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  Both 
specifications above include facility fixed effects.  The specification represented in Column (1) includes a set of peer demographic and criminal 
history variables while the specification presented in Column (2) does not.
  39Table 4.  Peer Effects and Specialization 




Larceny            R_Robbery
R_Felony 
Drug R_Misd.  Drug
R_Felony 
Weapon R_Felony  Sex
.021                  .16** .023 .15** .093 .55** .17 .11* -.0079 Offense*Peer_offense 
0.33                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
3.80 0.41 2.80 1.23 4.00 1.60 1.79 0.10
.049 -.024 -.044 -.078 -.095* .0024 -.020 .0041 .059* Peer_offense 
1.01 0.42 0.94 1.45 1.90 0.04 0.40 0.08 1.76
.080** .065** .043** .045** .042** .19** .11** .078** .052** Offense 
8.70 7.30 4.94 5.91 3.93 12.88 9.39 8.72 4.56
# who recidivate with 
offense   760 1116 770 954 369 762 738 1119 108
% who recidivate with 
offense  9.3%                 
                   
                 
13.6% 9.4% 11.6% 4.5% 9.3% 9.0% 13.6% 1.3%
#  observations
 
8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216
R
2 .0739 .0817 .0542 .0396 .0657 .1658 .0709 .0773 .0383
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects.  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of 
demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels. 
 
  40Table 5.  Specialization: Recent Criminal History versus Total Criminal History 




Larceny            R_Robbery
R_Felony 
Drug R_Misd.  Drug
R_Felony 
Weapon R_Felony  Sex
.018                  .16** .024 .16** .086 .54** .17* .11* .0013 Offense*Peer_offense 
0.28                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
3.75 0.43 2.84 1.13 3.95 1.64 1.78 0.02
.045 -.020 -.046 -.078 -.093* .0049 -.020 .00065 .056* Peer_offense 
0.92 0.35 0.99 1.44 1.87 0.08 0.41 0.01 1.69
.070** .061** .045** .042** .050** .18** .12** .078** .059** Offense 
6.75 6.39 4.61 5.33 4.01 10.66 9.14 7.81 4.45
.030 .0061 -.0037 .014 -.036* .021 -.052** -.013 -.030 Last Offense 
1.56 0.42 0.23 0.99 1.77 0.67 2.07 0.75 1.58
# who recidivate with 
offense   760 1116 770 954 369 762 738 1119 108
% who recidivate with 
offense  9.3%                 
                   
                   
13.6% 9.4% 11.6% 4.5% 9.3% 9.0% 13.6% 1.3%
#  observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216
R
2 .0766 .0838 .0552 .0402 .0680 .1677 .0750 .0807 .0399
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects.  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of 
demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels. 
 
  41Table 6.  Age and the Influence of Older Peers        




Larceny  R_Robbery 
R_Felony 
Drug  R_Misd. Drug 
R_Felony 
Weapon  R_Felony Sex 
-.010**                  -.015** -.0068* -.011** -.0015 -.00061 -.0018 -.0064 -.00075 Age Exit*Peer_age_exit 
2.40                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                   
2.84 1.67 2.35 0.48 0.19 0.52 1.22 0.34
.17** .25** .15** .19** .036 .019 .035 .10 .013 Peer_age_exit 
2.52 2.99 2.25 2.52 0.71 0.37 0.62 1.18 0.37
.15** .23** .10 .16** .021 .020 .034 .090 .011 Age_exit 
2.18 2.65 1.58 2.11 0.40 0.40 0.60 1.05 0.31
#  observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216
R
2                    .0734 .0814 .0540 .0381 .0620 .1593 .0691 .0752 .0351
    NOTE.—The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  A complete set of individual criminal history variables are included 
in each specification.  All specifications include facility fixed effects. 
  42Table 7.  Age, Specialization, and Peer Effects 
Dependent Var. = 
R_Grand 













-.12*                  -.037 -.027 -.072 -.27* -.060 -.011 .025 Age_exit* Offense*Peer_offense 
1.72                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                   
0.90 0.87 0.49 0.86 1.69 0.50 0.19 0.78
-.058** -.024 -.0059 .050 -.040* .027 -.0015 .0091 -.016 Age_exit*Peer_offense 
2.23 0.96 0.23 1.27 1.66 0.87 0.05 0.29 0.67
-.029** -.023** -.0084 -.0098 -.023** -.034** -.020 -.012 .0067 Age_exit* Offense 
3.10 3.23 1.10 1.43 2.16 2.08 1.56 1.53 0.71
2.0* .74 -.65 .58 1.2 4.8* 1.2 .27 -.41 Offense*Peer_offense 
1.75 1.15 0.82 0.65 0.93 1.93 0.60 0.32 0.80
.95** .33 .050 -.86 .51 -.42 -.0026 -.14 .31 Peer_offense 
2.29 0.87 0.13 1.37 1.36 0.87 0.01 0.28 0.84
.54** .42** .17 .20* .40** .74** .43** .27** -.051 Offense 
3.59 3.78 1.45 1.82 2.39 2.82 2.10 2.13 0.35
-.0099 -.0029 -.0037 -.012** -.0019 .015** .0068* -.0096* -.0016 Age_exit 
2.35 0.52 0.88 2.11 0.67 4.01 1.75 1.92 0.89
#  observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216
R
2  .0779                  .0834 .0544 .0400 .0685 .1677 .0714 .0776 .0387
.043
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification, where the dependent variable is recidivism with a particular type of offense. Thus, in the first column, the dependent variable is recidivism with a 
felony drug offense.  Peer_Offense varies across these specifications; it is exposure to peers with a history of the crime that is the dependent variable.  Thus, in the first column, Peer_Offense is really 
Peer_auto.  The sample mean was subtracted from each Peer_Offense variable.  All specifications include facility fixed effects.  In addition, they include individual demographic and criminal history variables 
as well as peer demographic and criminal history variables.  The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.   
 
 
  43Table 8.  Peer Effects When the Peer Group Is Defined According to Race  
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 













.030                  .070** -.013 .14** .062 .47** .16** .10** -.067 Offense*Peer_offense 
0.62                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
1.97 0.31 3.55 1.04 5.97 1.98 2.33 0.92
-.015 -.0085 -.00051 -.050 -.0044 .022 .030 .0077 .0053 Peer_offense 
0.55 0.26 0.02 1.48 0.17 0.67 0.92 0.25 0.21
.080** .063** .044** .044** .043** .17** .11** .078** .054** Offense 
8.66 7.07 5.03 5.85 4.05 11.11 9.39 8.75 4.57
# who recidivate with 
offense  756 1109 763 949 368 759 732 1112 108
#  observations
 
                   
                 
8147 8147 8147 8147 8147 8147 8147 8147 8147
R
2 .0748 .0819 .0529 .0418 .0677 .1719 .0710 .0794 .0385
    NOTE.—These specifications are identical to those presented in Table 4, except the only difference is how the peer group is defined.  In this table, the peer group is defined as all individuals of the same race 
who are in the facility at the same time.  Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals 
with a history of auto theft) while Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean 
of zero.  The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects.  In addition, these 
specifications include a detailed set of demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels. 
 
 
  44Table 9.  Peer Effects in Relatively Small Facilities   
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 













-.013                  .25** .12* .15** .18* .62** .19 .081 .079 Offense*Peer_offense 
0.15                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
4.81 1.84 2.19 1.81 3.39 1.49 1.10 0.67
.00027 -.092 -.066 -.084 -.065 .029 -.056 .028 .079* Peer_offense 
0.00 1.39 1.16 1.34 1.17 0.41 1.08 0.46 1.78
.080** .075** .037** .046** .056** .18** .11** .072** .057** Offense 
6.34 6.08 3.02 4.34 3.67 8.89 6.74 5.85 3.32
# who recidivate with 
offense  365 570 398 483 165 315 362 550 60
#  observations
 
                   
               
4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266
R
2 .0835 .1079 .0639 .0567 .0869 .1677 .0849 .0868 .0514 
    NOTE.—Since we cannot measure facility size directly, we approximate facility size by creating an index equal to the number of individuals released from a facility multiplied by the average number of days 
individuals stay in that facility.  The sample used in the above specifications includes those individuals in facilities where the average daily population is less than 20.  This eliminates approximately half of the 
sample.  Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects.  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of 
demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels. 
  45Table 10.  Peer Effects in Residential Facilities 




Larceny            R_Robbery
R_Felony 
Drug R_Misd.  Drug
R_Felony 
Weapon R_Felony  Sex
.0045                  .21** -.0016 .22** .092 .50** .21* .098 -.023 Offense*Peer_offense 
0.06                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
4.38 0.03 3.43 1.11 3.41 1.87 1.51 0.28
.053 -.079 -.011 -.16** -.11** .0093 -.064 .0097 .076** Peer_offense 
0.99 1.26 0.20 2.56 2.03 0.13 1.11 0.17 2.07
.081** .060** .042** .043** .041** .20** .11** .079** .056** Offense 
8.08 6.25 4.35 5.12 3.59 12.20 8.84 8.12 4.50
# who recidivate with 
offense   681 984 676 825 336 689 637 985 94
#  observations                   
                   
6992 6992 6992 6992 6992 6992 6992 6992 6992
R
2 .0731 .0783 .0509 .0399 .0643 .1708 .0705 .0801 .0422
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects.  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of 
demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels.  Note that these specifications only include individuals from residential facilities. 
  46Table 11.  Peer Effects for Individuals with Sentence Length of At Least 155 Days 




Larceny            R_Robbery
R_Felony 
Drug R_Misd.  Drug
R_Felony 
Weapon R_Felony  Sex
-.00045                  .15** -.074 .26** -.0033 .57** .12 .16* .00066 Offense*Peer_offense 
0.00                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
2.29 0.85 3.11 0.03 2.99 0.70 1.76 0.01
.20** -.074 .0069 -.11 -.29** -.18 .11 .046 .053 Peer_offense 
2.37 0.68 0.09 1.02 2.92 1.39 1.11 0.44 0.73
.087** .048** .057** .044** .045** .18** .11** .077** .050** Offense 
6.30 3.71 4.44 3.92 2.78 8.04 6.32 5.86 3.45
# who recidivate with 
offense   407 580 392 502 202 443 381 588 51
#  observations                   
                   
4130 4130 4130 4130 4130 4130 4130 4130 4130
R
2 .0930 .0994 .0799 .0636 .0820 .1934 .0934 .0992 .0581
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects.  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of 
demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels. 
 
 
  47Table 12.  Robustness: Individuals Released during the Middle Year of the Sample  
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 













.062                  .24** -.019 .14* .13 .34* .33** .13 -.0047 Offense*Peer_offense 
0.67                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
3.99 0.22 1.86 1.08 1.76 2.21 1.54 0.05
-.035 -.070 .0054 -.080 -.16** .065 -.049 -.074 .14** Peer_offense 
0.47 0.76 0.07 1.05 2.06 0.62 0.70 0.86 2.00
.084** .070** .033** .043** .047** .21** .13** .063** .061** Offense 
6.39 5.64 2.60 4.05 2.92 9.75 7.66 4.97 3.66
# who recidivate with 
offense  354 523 381 443 174 386 369 549 60
#  observations
 
                   
                 
4057 4057 4057 4057 4057 4057 4057 4057 4057
R
2 .0951 .1097 .0824 .0639 .0944 .1939 .1056 .1043 .0613
    NOTE.—The regressions above use just those 4,057 individuals who were released between December 30, 1997 and December 30, 1998 and who were younger than 17 at the time.  Each column represents a 
different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while Peer_offense in this specification is 
Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents 
significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects.  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of demographic and criminal history 
controls at both the individual and peer levels. 
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-.013** .031** -.013** -.019** .058** .044** .047** .0050* .011** .014**  Female 
3.58 7.79 3.96 8.37 9.05 8.06 7.60 1.71 5.83 7.49 
-.000041 -.0012 -.0017**  1.8e-06 -.00012 -.0017  -.0016 .00095 -.00043  -.00063  Black 
0.04 1.07 2.34 0.00 0.14 1.36 0.96 0.81 0.64 1.39 
.0017** -.0016** .0014**  -.00052  .0064** .0080** .014** .0024** .00022 .0033**  Age_exit 
2.79 2.21 2.71 1.37 4.79 4.60 5.30 3.05 0.52 5.47 
1.1e-06 -.00055** .00023* -.000029 -.000028 -.00019 .000030 -.000078  -.00020** -.000080  Age_1
st 
0.01 4.38 1.89 0.52 0.17 0.89 0.13 0.55 2.54 1.15 
.00014 -.000033  .000018  .000069** -.000026 1.5e-06 -.000042 .00013  .000012 .000031  Felonies 
1.62 0.50 0.28 1.98 0.29 0.01 0.30 1.35 0.20 0.75 
-.0076** .00053 .0068** .0035**  .0015  .012** .0045 -.011**  .0044**  .0022**  Fel Sex 
2.05 0.38 2.58 3.79 1.08 2.12 1.25 2.58 2.17 2.33 
.0015 -.0025  -.0035*  -.0031**  -.0028  -.00045 .0044 .0063**  .0052**  .00031  Mis Sex 
0.60 1.63 1.78 3.94 1.12 0.16 1.26 2.39 3.53 0.32 
.0047** -.00090 .0019** .00015  -.00060 -.0019* .000022 .0026**  -.00067* .00050  Fel Drug 
4.23 1.55 2.66 0.50 0.88 1.94 0.02 3.31 1.74 1.41 
.0017** .00011  .00025  .00053**  -.00070  -.0031**  -.00084 .00054 .00036 -.00011  Mis Drug 
2.39 0.23 0.56 2.75 1.21 3.89 1.00 1.07 1.13 0.50 
-.00013 .0010** .0016**  .00068** .00031  -.0014* -.0014 .00031  -.000073  .00013  Fel Weap 
0.25 2.23 3.47 3.54 0.54 1.67 1.35 0.53 0.22 0.50 
-.0010 -.00023  .0020** .00037 -.00012  -.000019 .00020  -.0015  .00034 .000089  Mis Weap 
0.85 0.26 2.45 0.97 0.11 0.01 0.10 1.52 0.58 0.17 
.000034 .00055 .000025  -.0012** .00075  .00056  .0013  .00080 -.00045 .00016  Auto 
0.05 1.10 0.05 3.62 1.12 0.66 1.42 1.33 1.26 0.62 
.00017 .00086** .00067 -.000087  -.0014**  -.0017** -.0022**  -.00021  -.00063*  -.00049** Grlrcn 
0.30 2.16 1.55 0.42 2.53 2.48 2.46 0.41 1.91 2.09 
.0010* -.00031 .00034 .00035*  -.00095*  -.0030** -.0017* .0027** -.00028  -.00021  Plrcn 
1.76 0.68 0.94 1.75 1.73 3.65 1.83 5.26 1.09 0.93 
.0012* .00030 .00039 -.00027  .000045 .0013 -.0014  .0010*  -.00055*  .00018  Burglary 
1.88 0.71 0.74 1.27 0.07 1.48 1.37 1.71 1.82 0.65 
.0031** -.00036 -.00065 -.000011 -.00052  -.0014 -.0017  .0023**  -.00051  -.000036  Robbery 
3.04 0.67 1.08 0.03 0.64 1.35 1.30 2.29 1.00 0.10 
.0040** .0029** -.0048** .00018  .0053** -.000046  .0018  .0053** .0029** .0017**  Escape 
2.79 3.25 3.70 0.36 3.96 0.03 1.19 4.36 3.42 3.34 
-.00066 -.0013** .00065*  .00010  .00020  -.00035 -.00026 .0011** .00029 4.8e-06  Vandalism 
1.13 3.09 1.68 0.60 0.38 0.55 0.35 2.01 1.01 0.02 
.0012 .00083  .000064  .000051  -.00087  -.00097 -.000068 .00030  .000010 .000026  Disorder 
1.40 1.24 0.12 0.14 0.99 0.94 0.05 0.41 0.03 0.07 
.0022  .0014* -.00086 .00065 -.0017* -.0035* -.0041** .0027*  -.00056  -.00045  Other 
1.47 1.82 0.94 1.59 1.83 1.79 2.27 1.76 0.80 0.99 
.00014 .000097 .00012 -.000046  -.000096  -.000056  -.00012  -.000062 -.000074 -.000015  Youth Crime in 
Zip  0.98 0.86 1.35 0.92 0.78 0.39 0.59 0.48 1.06 0.29 
.000087 -.0017  -.0011 -.00029 .00092 -.00031 .00096 .0034** .00066 .00024  % Own Race in 
Zip  0.06 1.47 1.23 0.52 0.77 0.23 0.46 2.48 0.89 0.44 
-.00030** -.00011  -.00012  4.1e-06  .000052 .00019 .000094  -.00027**  .000015  -.000038  Per-Cap Inc 
Race  2.58 1.26 1.52 0.10 0.56 1.51 0.58 2.65 0.25 0.89 
  49.021 .021**  -.020**  -.0078 .013  .0046 -.021 -.018 -.0056  -.0023  Unemployment 
Rate  1.38 2.24 2.19 1.65 1.09 0.30 1.02 1.28 0.69 0.39 
.00020** .000031 .00025**  .000078** -.00017** .000055 .000010 -.000017  .00012**  .000066  Incarcerated in 
Zip  2.49 0.53 3.27 2.34 2.03 0.46 0.08 0.24 2.72 1.59 
.0057 .0039 -.0030 .0025  -.012**  -.010* -.027** .0055  .00050  -.0036**  Low Risk 
1.10 0.91 0.92 1.61 3.07 1.86 3.36 1.41 0.23 2.16 
.026** .018**  .0070**  .0074**  .00010 -.0081 -.012* .023**  .0069**  .0071**  Mod Risk 
5.28 4.77 2.43 4.46 0.03 1.62 1.76 5.84 2.94 4.48 
.044** .033** .018** .014** .027** .033** .030** .040** .022** .027**  High Risk 
5.98 7.65 3.80 6.40 5.10 4.00 3.96 5.65 5.99  11.24 
.047** .035** .025** .016** .036** .052** .035** .042** .024** .033**  Max Risk 
4.40 6.35 4.42 4.14 7.78 4.14 4.22 2.97 5.68  15.08 
.00074 .00069 .00075 -.0033* -.0032 -.0051 -.012** -.0020  -.0032 -.0030*  Nonprofit Mgt 
0.20 0.25 0.25 1.97 0.90 1.14 2.10 0.52 1.61 1.83 
.019** .0047 -.0013  -.00035 .0081 -.0062 .0017 .016**  -.0020 .0036  For-profit Mgt 
2.05 1.07 0.30 0.13 1.62 1.22 0.28 2.52 0.65 1.17 
.021** .0027 -.0012  -.0054**  .0059 -.012* -.0076  .010 -.015**  -.0011  County Mgt 
3.41 0.43 0.27 2.40 1.45 1.77 0.90 1.12 2.98 0.43 
#  observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 
R
2  .5542 .5168 .3953 .5778 .5940 .4587 .4817 .5189 .4251 .6674 
    NOTE.—The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  The standard errors used to calculate the t-statistics are corrected for clustering within facilities.  ** 
represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications also include a set of judicial circuit dummies.  Minimum Risk 
(facilities) is the omitted risk level variable; State Mgt (facilities) is the omitted management type variable. 
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Larceny  R_Robbery 
.55**  .17  .11*  -.0079  .021  .16**  .023  .15**  .093  Offense*Peer_offense 
4.00  1.60  1.79  0.10  0.33  3.80  0.41  2.80  1.23 
.0024  .0046 .096 -.018 -.014 -.090 -.019 .12* -.035  Peer_fel_drg 
0.04  0.07 1.31 0.74 0.23 1.21 0.30 1.72 0.81 
.022  -.020  -.012 .036** -.028  -.092  -.012  -.031  .061*  Peer_mis_drg 
0.44  0.40  0.21 1.96 0.59 1.57 0.24 0.55 1.81 
-.060 .0065 .0041  .032* .035  -.055  -.00024  -.018 .0063  Peer_fel_wpn 
1.49 0.16 0.08  1.71 0.85  1.06  0.01 0.37 0.21 
-.011 .061  .12 .059*  .060 .15 .063  -.067  .040  Peer_fel_sex 
0.14 0.72 1.31 1.76  0.68 1.37 0.69 0.72 0.67 
.032 .035 .016  -.039**  .049  -.011 .039 .038 -.032  Peer_auto 
0.71 0.72 0.29 2.10 1.01  0.18 0.75 0.72 1.01 
-.0097 -.017  .056 -.0094 .0020  -.024  .035 -.017 .018  Peer_burg 
0.23 0.39 1.05 0.58 0.04 0.42  0.80 0.35 0.57 
.044 .038 .042  .031*  -.044 -.016 -.044  -.013 -.023  Peer_glrcn 
1.13 0.90 0.81 1.95 1.04 0.32 0.94  0.26 0.71 
.0040 .021 -.0051  .0017 .020  -.071 -.0049  -.078  .0085  Peer_plrcn 
0.11 0.52 0.10 0.10 0.46 1.43 0.11 1.45  0.30 
.091 .0040 -.086 -.025 .022 -.036 -.11*  -.014  -.095*  Peer_rob 
1.40 0.06 1.12 1.17 0.34 0.47 1.75 0.19 1.90 
-.20* .0021 .056 .0038 -.049 -.095  -.14 -.25** .053  Peer_mis_wpn 
1.83 0.02 0.43 0.07 0.45 0.70 1.23 1.98 0.66 
-.19 -.25 .23 -.12*  -.31* -.079  .15  .20  .37**  Peer_mis_sex 
1.01 1.20 0.93 1.70 1.71 0.33 0.73 0.85 2.05 
-.022 -.098** .047  .0068  .030 -.040 -.017  .099* .029  Peer_vand 
0.50 1.99 0.86 0.41 0.65 0.69 0.34 1.87 0.85 
.15** .097  .018  .017 -.037 -.040 .062 .010 -.020  Peer_dsord 
2.42 1.39 0.24 0.89 0.61 0.56 0.96 0.15 0.48 
.12 .029 -.12 .034 .12 .049  .089 .12 .063  Peer_escp 
1.59 0.38 1.21 0.87 1.52 0.53 1.00 1.31 1.12 
.036 .088 -.026  .041*  -.043 -.020  -.10  .026 -.016  Peer_other 
0.64 1.37 0.34 1.69 0.67 0.25 1.42 0.35 0.41 
.0078 -.043 -.023  .028 -.067 -.079 -.058 -.013 -.026  Peer_male 
0.10 0.54 0.24 0.65 0.93 0.99 0.89 0.13 0.73 
.0033 .0041 -.0066  .000027  .013 .033*  .047**  .012 .010  Peer_age_exit 
0.23 0.27 0.38 0.00 0.91 1.88 2.91 0.69 1.01 
-9.2e-06** -6.5e-06*  2.5e-06  1.4e-06  -4.0e-06 5.7e-06 5.8e-06 -2.6e-07 3.0e-06  Peer_Percapi 
2.55 1.68 0.55 1.00 1.11 1.20 1.47 0.06 1.07 
.000074 .000037  .00010  .000011 -.00010 .000067  -.000023  -.000031  .000073  Peer_Percorin 
1.05 0.50 1.19 0.41 1.53 0.77 0.28 0.38 1.32 
-.0038 -.016  .015 -.00011 .012 -.0042  -.0062  -.0063  -.010  Peer_age1st  
0.35 1.38 1.18 0.03 1.14 0.29 0.55 0.51 1.33 
# who recidivate with 
offense   762 738  1119  108 760 1116 770 954 369 
#  observations  8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 
R
2  .1658 .0709 .0773 .0383 .0739 .0817 .0542 .0396 .0657 
    NOTE.—The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility 
fixed effects.  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of demographic and criminal history controls. 
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Larceny  R_Robbery 
.19**  .039** .0041 .00069  -.022**  -.041** -.031** -.028**  .0032  Fel drug 
12.88  3.08 0.31 0.17 2.16 3.56 3.37  2.59 0.37 
.0099  .11**  .012 -.0016  -.0039  -.0082 -.011  -.023**  .0067  Mis drug 
1.00  9.39  1.12 0.48 0.45 0.78 1.27 2.45 0.99 
-.0073 -.0064 .078**  -.00052 -.0015  .0039  .0021  .0040  .0096*  Fel weap 
1.03 0.89 8.72  0.20 0.20  0.45  0.27 0.51 1.80 
-.033** -.026**  -.011  .052**  .0024 -.025  -.031**  -.012  -.0031  Fel sex 
2.80 2.09 0.68 4.56  0.16 1.56 2.41 0.77 0.31 
.019** .020**  .0082  .0013 .080**  .020** .0063  .010 .023**  Auto theft 
2.25 2.36 0.86 0.44 8.70  1.98 0.74  1.13 3.66 
.0069 .0018 -.0099 .0030 .014* .065**  .023** .018**  .0025  Burglary 
0.92 0.23 1.09 0.92 1.77 7.30  2.98 2.16 0.46 
-.0075 -.0047 -.0034 -.0018 .0041  .018*  .043**  .0054 .0039  Grlrcn 
1.05 0.61 0.38 0.57 0.50 1.85 4.94  0.60 0.66 
-.0017 .0081 -.0065  -.00015  .012* .022** .025**  .045**  .0035  Plrcn 
0.25 1.18 0.81 0.06 1.76 2.74 3.74 5.91  0.73 
.022* .0058 .025* -.0053  -.0013 -.0075  -.029**  -.00086  .042**  Robbery 
1.84 0.53 1.80 1.48 0.12 0.59 3.03 0.07 3.93 
-.018 -.0060 .011  .0015  .022 -.0090 -.018 -.022 .0020  Mis weap 
1.16 0.38 0.50 0.22 1.21 0.48 1.24 1.28 0.17 
.039 -.018  -.0012  -.022**  .013 .053 .029  .074*  .040  Mis sex 
1.07 0.61 0.03 4.64 0.34 1.15 0.74 1.66 1.17 
.019 .0039  .029*  -.000053  .029** .0039 .00053 .0037 -.0016  Escape 
1.43 0.30 1.76 0.01 1.97 0.24 0.04 0.25 0.15 
-.020** -.0076  .010  -.0047* .0017 .0065 .014* .0097 .0054  Vandalism 
2.84 1.02 1.14 1.74 0.22 0.71 1.70 1.14 0.99 
.0034 .0031 .028*  .00069  -.0046 .0025 .0068 .0055 .019**  Disorder 
0.29 0.27 1.89 0.16 0.40 0.19 0.60 0.42 1.96 
.026** .014 .048**  .0029 .013 .020 .013  .028**  .0074  Other 
3.11 1.35 4.35 0.56 1.24 1.51 1.09 2.29 1.08 
# who recidivate with 
offense:   762  738 1119 108  760 1116 770  954  369 
# observations  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216  8216 
R
2 .1658  .0709  .0773  .0383  .0739 .0817 .0542 .0396 .0657 
    NOTE.—The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility 
fixed effects.  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of demographic and criminal history controls. 
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Dependent Variable =  Days In 
-1.1  Female 
0.34 
3.9*  Black 
1.81 
20.4**  Age Exit 
25.29 
-9.5**  Age First Offense 
16.00 
133.8**  Last Felony Sex 
17.61 
-5.4  Last Misd. Sex 
0.24 
-3.9  Last Felony Drug 
0.82 
-17.5**  Last Misd. Drug 
3.58 
16.0**  Last Auto Theft 
3.81 
24.0**  Last Burglary 
6.94 
2.3  Last Grand Larceny 
0.59 
-11.0**  Last Petty Larceny 
2.92 
47.5**  Last Robbery 
8.29 
31.7**  Last Escape 
5.28 
5.6  Last Vandalism 
1.14 
-18.0*  Last Disorder 
1.95 
33.3**  Last Felony Weapon 
9.12 
-3.7  Last Misd. Weapon 
0.28 
2.4  Last Other 
0.55 
41.9**  Past Felony Sex 
9.07 
14.9  Past Misd. Sex 
1.30 
-5.4*  Past Felony Drug 
1.66 
-15.2**  Past Misd. Drug 
5.44 
12.6**  Past Auto Theft 
5.08 
5.0**  Past Burglary 
2.06 
8.6**  Past Grand Larceny 
3.50 
-2.7  Past Petty Larceny 
1.20 
25.6**  Past Robbery 
7.60 
46.0**  Past Escape 
10.45 
1.2  Past Vandalism 
0.49 
.66  Past Disorder 
0.18 
  536.5**  Past Felony Weapon 
2.76 
6.0  Past Misd. Weapon 
1.17 
-4.1  Past Other 
0.98 
181.9**  Constant 
185.11 
# observations  14127 
R
2  .1212 
NOTE.—The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level 
and * represents significance at 10% level.  All variables are constructed such that they have 
mean zero.  This regression uses the entire sample of individuals released from these 169 
facilities. 
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